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THE FIRST CUT IS THE DEEPEST, BUT THE SECOND
MAY BE ACTIONABLE: MASSON V. NEW




The law of defamation1 has undergone dramatic changes during the
past thirty years, largely as a result of the landmark United States
Supreme Court decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.2 That case
recognized that huge libel awards threaten to undermine First Amend-
ment3 guarantees of freedom of speech and press.' The case marked the
first step in an evolutionary process in which courts set up an elaborate
set of rules aimed at balancing the interests of libel plaintiffs against the
need to protect First Amendment values.5
An important step in this process involved the development of the
"libel-proof plaintiff doctrine."6 This doctrine asserts that a plaintiff's
reputation may already be so damaged, either by prior unchallenged rep-
etition of damaging statements7 or by the plaintiff's prior criminal rec-
ord,8 that even if the plaintiff were successful in a libel action, any
damages awarded would be minimal.9 In this situation, courts have held
that society's interest in protecting First Amendment values outweighs
the plaintiff's interest in vindicating his or her reputation.10
1. Defamation is "a false communication, either published or publicly spoken, that in-
jures another's reputation or good name." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 417 (6th ed. 1990).
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3. The First Amendment provides, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The United States Supreme Court first
applied the First Amendment through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the states in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
4. The Court stated: "Whether or not a newspaper can survive a succession of such
judgments, the pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those who would give voice to public
criticism is an atmosphere in which the First Amendment freedoms cannot survive." New
York Times, 376 U.S. at 278.
5. See infra notes 24-51 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 71-105 and accompanying text.
7. See Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1986).
8. See, e-g., Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1975).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 71-78.
10. See infra text accompanying note 72.
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A branch of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, the incremental harm
doctrine,"1 holds that a plaintiff is not entitled to burden a defendant
with a libel suit if the statements challenged by the plaintiff damage his
or her reputation far less than the unchallenged or nonactionable portion
of the publication.' 2 Courts developed this rule as a response to plaintiffs
who disputed only relatively minor assertions in publications that were
otherwise extremely negative or unflattering. Courts have offered vari-
ous policy reasons to justify the rule, including judicial economy 3 and
the desire to prevent a chilling effect on the press caused by suits filed to
harass media defendants rather than to redress injuries."4
In Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.," the United States
Supreme Court held that this branch of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine
is not constitutionally mandated. 6 The Court held that the First
Amendment does not require dismissal of an action as a matter of law
when a statement has harmed a plaintiff's reputation by only a small
increment beyond the harm caused by the nonactionable remainder of
the publication. 7
The Supreme Court's refusal to grant constitutional status to the
incremental harm doctrine does not end the matter, however. Following
Masson, the issue of how to treat cases in which a plaintiff challenges
only a minor portion of an overall publication will be a matter for state
courts.18 State courts concerned about restricting use of the judicial sys-
11. See infra notes 79-105 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text. This doctrine may be invoked at any
stage of litigation, including summary judgment, judgment notwithstanding the verdict and
jury instruction. Thus far courts have invoked the doctrine mainly at the summary judgment
stage. See, eg., Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.) (reversing district court denial of
summary judgment for defendant), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986); Crane v. Arizona Re-
public, 729 F. Supp. 698 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Finklea v. Jacksonville Daily Progress, 742 S.W.2d
512 (rex. Ct. App. 1987) (affirming grant of summary judgment for defendant); Simmons
Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(granting defendant summary judgment). In Gannett Co. v. Re, 496 A.2d 553 (Del. 1985), the
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, holding so on the basis that the accurate portion of the publication at issue had not
rendered the plaintiff libel proof. Id at 558.
13. Finklea, 742 S.W.2d at 517.
14. Simmons Ford, 516 F. Supp. at 750; Finklea, 742 S.W.2d at 517.
15. 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
16. Id. at 2436.
17. Id.
18. Id. (stating that California remains free to adopt incremental harm doctrine). On re-
mand, the Ninth Circuit held that the incremental harm doctrine is "not an element of Califor-
nia libel law." Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., No. 87-2665, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
6152 at *6 (9th Cir. Apr. 6, 1992). However, this represents only the Ninth Circuit's estima-
tion of what the California Supreme Court would hold on the issue, because California state
courts have yet to rule on the subject.
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tem for possibly frivolous lawsuits and about the potential chilling effect
such lawsuits can have on the press19 may still find the doctrine useful.2'
This Note recognizes that these courts may find the doctrine justified by
their own state constitutional or statutory free-speech and free-press
guarantees. 21 But even disregarding possible state constitutional argu-
ments, this Note argues that the incremental harm doctrine offers a way
to analyze causation issues in defamation actions.22 The incremental-
harm analysis may lead a court either to dismiss a suit in which the chal-
lenged statements damage a plaintiff's reputation only a negligible
amount over the rest of the publication or, at the very least, to limit
damage awards in such suits, based on simple common-law tort
principles.23
II. LIBEL LAW AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Several interests have been identified as underlying the First
Amendment's guarantees of free speech and free press. Under the mar-
ketplace of ideas theory, the value of free speech lies in the search for
truth.24 Free speech also is viewed as necessary for self-government or to
further the democratic process.25 Freedom of speech also may be essen-
tial to an individual's self-fulfillment and self-realization. 6
Defamation requires communication to a third party of something
false that may affect the community's opinion of the plaintiff.2  It en-
19. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 241-84 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 241-46 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 247-55 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 256-73 and accompanying text.
24. See, eg., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[Tlhe best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market. . . ."). For a similar view by Justice Brandeis, see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 375-78 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
25. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government, in
POLITICAL FREEDOM 3 (1948); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute,
1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 255-57; Alexander Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Self-Preservation
Against Political Freedom, 49 CAL. L. REv. 4, 12 (1961). This theory emphasizes the impor-
tance of "political speech" in the interpretation of the First Amendment, because the require-
ments of democratic systems are seen as twofold: access to information necessary to informed
decision-making and the ability to communicate with elected representatives. Lawrence B.
Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment Freedom of
Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 54, 73 (1989).
26. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 55 (1982).
27. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at
771 (5th ed. 1984). At common law, truth was a defense in defamation actions, and the de-
fendant had the burden of pleading and proving the truth of the publication at issue. Id. at
841. The Supreme Court's decision in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767
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compasses both libel, which refers to written attacks on a person's repu-
tation,2  and slander, which involves oral attacks.29 At common law,
statements were per se libelous if they involved imputation of crime or of
a loathsome disease, or if they affected the plaintiff in his or her business
or trade.3" In these situations, the plaintiff was not required to prove any
actual damage to his or her reputation.31
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 32 the Supreme Court held that de-
famatory communications were not to be afforded First Amendment pro-
tection because they "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality. '33 The law of defamation thus was essentially part of the
tort law of "strict liability" or "liability without fault."' 34 That changed,
however, with the landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan."
New York Times involved a libel action by a city commissioner against
the newspaper.36 Sullivan sued over an advertisement that contained
statements critical of a police action against student demonstrators that
he said referred to him in his official duties. 37 The Court held that the
Constitution prohibited a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct in the absence of
proof from which a jury could find with convincing clarity that the de-
fendant had published the defamatory statement with " 'actual malice'-
that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not."
'38
The Court based its decision on what it saw as "a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be unin-
(1986), placed the burden of proving falsity on the plaintiff in certain cases. See infra notes 50-
51 and accompanying text.
28. KEETON et al., supra note 27, § 111, at 771.
29. Id Modem communications have blurred the distinction between libel and slander.
Thus radio and television communications, although they involve the spoken word, are some-
times treated as libel, because of their ability "to widely disseminate the spoken word or to
disseminate the spoken word with more permanency than does the traditional concept of slan-
der." Miles v. Perry, 529 A.2d 199, 209 n.lI (Conn. App. Ct. 1987).
30. KEETON et al., supra note 27, § 112, at 788.
31. Id This is known as the doctrine of presumed damages. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 329 (1974).
32. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
33. Id. at 572.
34. LAURENCE H. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 5, at 15 (1978).
35. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
36. Id. at 256.
37. Id. at 256-58.
38. Id. at 279-80.
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hibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials."3 9 The Court later extended the actual malice standard
to cases in which a plaintiff is any public figure, even if he or she is not a
public official."
In 1974 the Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.41 held that the
First Amendment prohibits holding broadcasters or publishers of defam-
atory falsehoods strictly liable for defamatory publications.42 Where the
plaintiff is a private figure, however, the Court held that the New York
Times actual malice standard does not apply.43 Instead, the Court held
that the plaintiff must prove something more than that the communica-
tion was made and that it was false.4 Reiterating the principle that
"[t]he First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in or-
der to protect speech that matters,"45 the Court limited the recovery of
damages to those situations in which the plaintiff could prove some "ac-
39. Id. at 270. There is some question as to how much of the holding in New York Times
rested on the fact that the communication involved a "public issue." In some cases the Court
has suggested that statements relating to "public issues" receive heightened protection under
the Constitution. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
758-59 (1985) (plurality opinion) ("It is speech on 'matters of public concern' that is 'at the
heart of the First Amendment's protection."' (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 776 (1978))). Allowing courts to determine what issues are of "public concern" carries its
own dangers, however. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, stated: "We doubt the wisdom of committing this task [of determin-
ing what publications address issues of 'general or public interest'] to the conscience of
judges." Id. at 346.
Similarly, it is unclear how much of the Court's decisions, including New York Times, can
be attributed to the fact that the defendant is a member of the media. See Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2706 (1990) ("[A] statement on matters of public concern must
be provable as false before there can be liability under state defamation law, at least in situa-
tions, like the present, where a media defendant is involved."); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.
v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 779 n.4 (1985) ("We also have no occasion to consider.., what
standards would apply if the plaintiff sues a nonmedia defendant."); Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
443 U.S. 111, 133 n.16 (1979) (stating Court has never decided question of whether New York
Times standard applies to individual defendant rather than to media defendant).
40. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154 (1967) (ruling athletic director at
major university was as much public figure as public official in New York Times). In Gertz, the
Court defined "public figures" and explained the rationale for imposing a higher burden on
them as plaintiffs in libel actions. The Court explained that public figures are, generally, peo-
ple who have "thrust themselves to the forefront of particular controversies" and who "invite
attention and comment." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
41. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
42. Id. at 347.
43. Id. at 343.
44. Id. at 347 ("We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the
States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broad-
caster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.").
45. Id. at 341.
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tual injury."' 46 However, the Court did not define exactly what consti-
tuted "actual injury." It noted that this would not be limited to "out-of-
pocket loss," but could include impairment of reputation and standing in
the community, personal humiliation and mental anguish and suffering.
47
The Court also held that in most situations, presumed damages are
contrary to First Amendment principles.4 By requiring plaintiffs to
show fault, the Court thus continued a theme of striking a balance be-
tween the interests of defamation plaintiffs and the constitutional guaran-
tee of freedom of the press.4 9
The Supreme Court recently reinforced its commitment to the prin-
ciples of New York Times in a case involving a private-figure plaintiff. In
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps5 the Court held that where a
newspaper publishes speech of public concern about a private figure, the
private-figure plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the statements at
issue are false.51
Although these developments have constitutionalized much of the
law of defamation, they have left many gaps that have been filled by
lower courts. The result has been a patchwork that has developed
around the law of defamation as conflicts have arisen over these areas
that the Court has left open. Several of these areas of libel law and First
Amendment doctrine are implicated by the incremental harm doctrine,
46. Id. at 349.
47. Id. at 350.
48. The Court noted:
The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort law, for it allows recovery of
purportedly compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss.... The largely
uncontrolled discretion of juries to award damages where there is no loss unnecessa-
rily compounds the potential of any system of liability for defamatory falsehood to
inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms. Additionally, the doc-
trine of presumed damages invites juries to punish unpopular opinion rather than to
compensate individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a false fact.
Id. at 349.
Nevertheless, the Court has not entirely eliminated the doctrine of presumed damages. In
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (plurality opinion),
the Court held that if the plaintiff is a private figure and the publication's content is of purely
private concern, then presumed damages are constitutionally permissible. Id. at 753.
49. See Comment, The Libel Proof Plaintiff Doctrine, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1909, 1914-16
(1985).
50. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
51. Id. at 777. In its discussion, the Court noted that "the need to encourage debate on
public issues" is also of concern in suits by private individuals because such actions may deter
speech. Id.
Because such a "chilling" effect would be antithetical to the First Amendment's pro-
tection of true speech on matters of public concern, we believe that a private-figure
plaintiff must bear the burden of showing that the speech at issue is false before
recovering damages for defamation from a media defendant.
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including the actual injury requirement and the availability of nominal
and punitive damages in defamation actions.
A. The Actual-Injury Requirement
The Gertz Court's refusal to define "actual injury" has led to disa-
greement over whether injury to reputation is a constitutional prerequi-
site to a defamation recovery, or whether such recovery can be based on
other types of injury such as emotional distress.12 The issue is essential
in any discussion of the incremental harm doctrine, because it goes to the
heart of what the purpose of libel law is or should be.53 If vindication of
the plaintiff's good name, or of the damage done to his or her dignity,54
is a permissible purpose of such an action,55 then perhaps such suits
should be sustainable even if a plaintiff stands a chance of winning only
nominal damages at most. If the tort of defamation is designed to com-
pensate for damage to reputation, then perhaps, in the interest of safe-
guarding First Amendment freedoms, a libel plaintiff should be required
to show some actual damage to his or her reputation as a prerequisite for
maintaining a libel action.
The proposition that injury to reputation should be a threshold re-
quirement in libel actions has roots both in the common law 6 and in
52. The Supreme Court has held that the New York Times protections apply in emotional
distress actions as well as in libel actions. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46
(1988).
53. For a discussion of the interests protected and the types of injuries compensable by
defamation law, see infra notes 256-69 and accompanying text.
54. For a discussion of "dignitary" injuries in libel actions, see infra notes 261-73 and
accompanying text.
55. Defamation is a tort, and as such is based on the concept of compensation for injury,.
But one of the driving forces behind many defamation suits is the plaintiff's desire to have the
falsity of the defamatory publication recognized in court-i.e., to vindicate his or her view of
the truth. See, for example, Randall P. Bezanson et al., The Economics of Libel An Empirical
Assessment, in THE CoST OF LIBEL 21 (Everette E. Dennis et al. eds., 1989), which discusses
selected findings of the Iowa Libel Research Project. The project, based on analyses of defa-
mation cases and interviews with libel plaintiffs and news organizations, found that most plain-
tiffs, once they have decided to litigate, are motivated by a desire to restore their reputation or
to punish the media. Id. at 25. The author concludes that the legal system's focus on mone-
tary compensation is inconsistent with libel plaintiffs' interest in "curing alleged falsity." Id.
One alternative to the compensation-based model that has been suggested is allowing
plaintiffs to sue for declaratory judgments. See, e.g., Marc A. Franklin, New Perspectives in the
Law of Defamation: A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74 CAL. L.
REV. 809 (1986). Such a remedy would obviate the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, because dam-
age to the plaintiff's reputation would be irrelevant. Others have suggested, however, that
courts may be an improper forum for ascertainment of "truth." See Henry R. Kaufman,
Trends in Damage Awards, Insurance Premiums and the Cost of Media Libel Litigation, in
THE COST OF LIBEL, supra, at 1, 10.
56. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 417 (6th ed. 1990) (defamation is "that which tends
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Supreme Court precedent.5 7 In the wake of Gertz, other courts and com-
mentators have supported this proposition, 8 although state and federal
courts remain divided. 9
B. Punitive Damages
The Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. I also held that punitive
damages require proof of actual malice.61 Some commentators since
to injure reputation"); Comment, supra note 49, at 1914 ("The common law recognizes a tort
of defamation in order to compensate plaintiffs for injuries to reputation.").
57. See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 275 (1971) ("Damage to reputation is
.. the essence of libel."); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 391 (1967) (stating that libel
involves "state interest in the protection of the individual against damage to his reputation").
But see Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 459-61 (1976) (holding that state's decision to
permit recovery for other injuries, without regard to any injury to reputation, did not violate
Gertz requirement that compensatory awards be supported by competent evidence concerning
injury).
58. See, e-g., Finklea v. Jacksonville Daily Progress, 742 S.W.2d 512, 516 (Tex. Ct. App.
1987).
While injury to reputation is but one of several elements of general damage that the
jury may consider in the assessment of damages in defamation, the others, such as
personal humiliation, mental anguish and suffering, are those that presumably result
from injury to reputation. Therefore, defamation claims must be predicated upon
injury to reputation ....
Id.; see also Dresbach v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F. Supp. 1285, 1293 (D.D.C. 1981) (stating
that injury to reputation must be shown to sustain libel claim); Martin v. Municipal Publica-
tions, 510 F. Supp. 255, 257 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (stating that determination of defamation action's
merits requires inquiry into whether defendant has harmed plaintiff's reputation within mean-
ing of Pennsylvania law); Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 649 P.2d 1239, 1243 (Kan. 1982)
(holding that under Kansas law, damage to reputation is "essence and gravamen" of action for
defamation); France v. St. Clare's Hosp. & Health Ctr., 441 N.Y.S.2d 79, 82-83 (App. Div.
1981) (holding that absent harm to reputation, plaintiff cannot recover on defamation claim
unless he or she can prove actual malice, and that emotional distress claim is not compensable
without concomitant loss of reputation); Salomone v. MacMillan Publishing Co., 429
N.Y.S.2d 441,442-43 (App. Div. 1980) (holding that claim for mental anguish is compensable
only when coupled with loss of reputation).
59. For cases holding that damage to reputation is not required for defamation recovery,
see Rennier v. State, 428 So. 2d 1261, 1264 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that under state law,
defamation damages may be based on evidence of personal humiliation, embarrassment and
mental anguish and suffering); Hearst Corp. v. Hughes, 466 A.2d 486, 494-95 (Md. 1983)
(holding that to recover compensatory damages in negligent defamation actions, actual impair-
ment of reputation need not be proved); International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Local 1805 v. Mayo, 379 A.2d 1223, 1226-27 (Md. 1977) (finding that where it is found that
defamatory statement was published with actual malice, plaintiff's failure to prove injury to
reputation does not bar libel recovery).
60. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
61. Id at 350. This rule applies to private-figure plaintiffs as well as public figures. Id.
Justice Powell wrote for the majority: "Like the doctrine of presumed damages, jury discre-
tion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacerbates the danger of media self-censorship,
but, unlike the former rule, punitive damages are wholly irrelevant to the state interest that
justifies a negligence standard for private defamation actions." Id. Justice Marshall suggested
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have suggested that punitive damages in the libel context may be uncon-
stitutional because of their potential to become an instrument for punish-
ing unpopular views and because of their "especially severe inhibiting
effect upon expression." '
62
C. Nominal Damages
Another issue that bears directly on the incremental harm doctrine
is whether plaintiffs should be allowed to sustain libel actions in which
the most they can hope to win is nominal damages. 3 As with the issue
of injury to reputation, the Supreme Court has left open this issue."
Some courts and commentators have concluded that in at least some cir-
cumstances, suits that seek only nominal damages are antithetical to the
First Amendment's protection of free speech. Given the skyrocketing
costs of defending against libel actions,66 and given that the essence of
that punitive damages should be abolished altogether in the defamation context. See Rosen-
bloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 84 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Threats to
society's interest in freedom of the press that are involved in punitive and presumed damages
can largely be eliminated by restricting the award of damages to proved, actual injuries.").
While not going that far, Justice Scalia has indicated that he does not disagree with the Gertz
Court's limitation of punitive damages:
[Tihe principle I apply today does not reject our cases holding that procedure de-
manded by the Bill of Rights-which extends against the States only through the
Due Process Clause-must be provided despite historical practice to the contrary.
Thus, it does not call into question the proposition that punitive damages, despite
their historical sanction, can violate the First Amendment.
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1054 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
62. BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY 435 (2d ed. 1991); see also Lois G. FORER,
A CHILLING EFFECT 110 (1987) ("The requirement of proof of damages and the abolition of
punitive damages except in cases of personal spite or ill will (the common law definition of
malice) would probably result in the reasonable verdicts returned by juries in other kinds of
cases.").
63. Traditionally, remedies for libel actions have been compensatory, nominal and puni-
tive damages. SHELDON W. HALPERN, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION, PRIVACY, PUBLICITY
AND "MORAL RIGHTS" 155 (1988).
64. See Lakian v. Globe Newspaper Co., 504 N.E.2d 1046, 1048 n.6 (Mass. 1987) ("The
Supreme Court of the United States has not decided whether the protection of First Amend-
ment rights bars recovery of nominal damages against a newspaper by a public-figure plaintiff
who proves publication of a false, defamatory communication with actual malice but fails to
prove that he sustained any actual injury.").
65. See Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 1511, 1518-19 (D.N.J. 1986)
(holding that as matter of federal constitutional law, nominal damages may not be recovered
against media defendant where public figure plaintiff fails to prove any actual injury), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 847 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1988); Jackson v. Longcope, 476 N.E.2d 617, 619-20
(Mass. 1985) ("[Wle accept the principle that a libel-proof plaintiff is not entitled to burden a
defendant with a trial in which the most favorable result the plaintiff could achieve is an award
of nominal damages.").
66. The increasingly heavy costs on defendants of defending libel suits has been extensively
chronicled in Kaufman, supra note 55, at 1. Kaufman states that about 75% of motions for
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libel actions is damage to reputation, the interests of plaintiffs who have
suffered no serious damage to their reputations may be outweighed by
the First Amendment interests upon which such suits may ultimately
infringe.67
Also relevant in any discussion of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine is
judicial preference for disposing of libel cases at the summary judgment
stage when possible."
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE INCREMENTAL HARM DOCTRINE
The libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, which encompasses the incremen-
tal harm doctrine, seems to have arisen as courts groped for a basis in
logic and law for dismissing suits that seemed intuitively groundless. 9
summary judgment are granted in favor of the libel defendant. Id. at 6-7 (citing LIBEL DE-
FENSE RESOURCE CENTER BULLETIN No. 16, Mar. 15, 1986, at 15). Kaufman notes that
despite this fact, there has been an "explosion" of litigation costs for libel plaintiffs and defend-
ants because of the complexity of the legal standards involved in such actions, even where the
complaint is ultimately dismissed. I. at 8. Kaufman recommends that courts "devise meth-
ods to assure that the money, time, and energy of all parties is not wasted on fruitless litiga-
tion." Id. at 9; see also FORER, supra note 62, at 81 ("The fear of substantial verdicts often
induces media defendants to pay large sums in settlement of libel suits even when it was rea-
sonably clear that the plaintiff had not suffered any provable damages."); Alex S. Jones, Libel
Study Finds Juries Penalizing News Media, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1991, at A28 (stating study
found news organizations increasingly likely to lose libel suits that go to jury, and face multi-
million dollar damage judgments; libel judgments have proven so potentially devastating that
many news organizations now settle with plaintiffs rather than risk loss on appeal).
67. See HALPERN, supra note 63, at 155:
[The damage remedy has sometimes proved to be unfair to the defendant. Defama-
tion actions have not infrequently been brought-or jury verdicts have been ren-
dered, irrespective of the plaintiff's motivation in bringing the action-not to
compensate for actual pecuniary loss or to vindicate the plaintiff, but instead to
cudgel the defendant and to mulct him for substantial damages that may be like a
windfall to the plaintiff. It is cases of this sort that have helped to persuade the
Supreme Court to intervene and set restrictions and standards that will protect the
country's commitment to free speech and free press.
Id.
68. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510-11
(1984) (holding that appellate courts in defamation actions must evaluate independently of
trier of fact whether evidence is sufficient to meet constitutional requirements); Crane v. Ari-
zona Republic, 729 F. Supp. 698, 701 (C.D. Cal. 1989) ("[Tjhere is a strong federal policy of
disposing of libel cases by motion rather than trial where possible."); Gintert v. Howard Publi-
cations, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 829, 831 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (summary judgment is "peculiarly appro-
priate in libel cases . . . 'where considerations of constitutional freedoms arise'" (quoting
Schuster v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 973, 975 (D. Minn. 1978))). The
United States Supreme Court has stated that dismissal before trial of suits brought by public
figures is proper when the plaintiff fails to produce clear and convincing evidence of actual
malice. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1986).
69. A good example of such a case is Jackson v. Longcope, 476 N.E.2d 617 (Mass. 1985).
The allegedly libelous news article said that Jackson had been convicted of murder, kidnap-
ping, rape and robbery; indicted for the slaying of two other young women in which all the
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The libel-proof plaintiff doctrine includes two branches-the issue-spe-
cific libel-proof plaintiff doctrine and the incremental harm doctrine.7"
A. The Issue-Specific Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine
The libel-proof plaintiff doctrine first arose in Cardillo v. Doubleday
& Co. ,71 in which the Second Circuit held as a matter of law that a plain-
tiff who challenged published statements that he had participated in nu-
merous specific crimes was "libel proof, i.e., so unlikely by virtue of his
life as a habitual criminal to be able to recover anything other than nomi-
nal damages as to warrant dismissal of the case, involving as it does First
Amendment considerations. 72
As other courts applied the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, they lim-
ited it to plaintiffs who had tarnished reputations with respect only to
particular issues. 73 For example, in Wynberg v. National Enquirer, Inc. I
the defendant newspaper published an article stating that the plaintiff
had used his relationship with Elizabeth Taylor for financial gain.75 The
court cited plaintiff's numerous convictions for criminal offenses involv-
ing women as evidence of a "reputation for taking advantage of women
generally, and of Miss Taylor specifically."' 76 The court stated that an
"individual who engages in certain anti-social or criminal behavior and
suffers a diminished reputation may be 'libel-proof' as a matter of law, as
[the alleged libel] relates to that specific behavior."'77 Courts have contin-
ued to limit the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine to the issue-specific
victims were raped and strangled; and convicted of crimes associated with a shoot-out with the
Cambridge police "during a stolen car chase." Id. at 618. Jackson claimed that he was libeled
because not all the victims were raped and strangled and the shoot-out had not occurred dur-
ing a "stolen car chase." Id. at 618-19. The court detailed the plaintiff's extensive history of
convictions for murder and rape. Id. at 620-21. In addition, the court noted that the plaintiff
had challenged only certain details of the article, but had conceded the truth of the events
detailed in the story. Id. at 621. The court concluded that Jackson was libel-proof. Id.
70. The two specific branches were first identified and canvassed in Comment, supra note
49, at 1910-14.
71. 518 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1975).
72. Idl at 639. In support of its finding that the plaintiff was a "habitual criminal," the
court cited the plaintiff's long history of criminal activity, including his prior convictions and
indictment for various acts that were similar to those described in the challenged publication.
Id. at 640.
73. See, eg., Ray v. United States Dep't of Justice, 508 F. Supp. 724, 726 (E.D. Mo.),
aff'd, 658 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1981); Ray v. Time, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 618, 622 (W.D. Tenn.
1976), aff'd per curiam, 582 F.2d 1280 (6th Cir. 1978).
74. 564 F. Supp. 924 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
75. Id. at 928.
76. Id.
77. Id. The court granted summary judgment for the National Enquirer both because the
plaintiff was held to be "libel-proof as a matter of law," and because the report was "substan-
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situation.7
B. The Incremental Harm Doctrine
The incremental harm branch of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine
was first applied in Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc.79 The plaintiff sued the publisher of Consumer Reports mag-
azine over an article about an electric car the plaintiff manufactured. 80
The car was rated "Not Acceptable," based on a number of safety
problems relating to the car's construction and speed."s The plaintiff did
not contest most of the findings about the car,82 challenging only a por-
tion of the article relating to mandatory federal safety standards that did
not yet exist at the time. 3 Given the complexity of the standards at
tially true." Id at 927. For a discussion of the substantial truth defense, see supra notes 116-
22 and accompanying text.
78. See Logan v. District of Columbia, 447 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 (D.D.C. 1978) (applying
District of Columbia law); Urbano v. Sondern, 41 F.R.D. 355, 357 (D. Conn.) (applying Con-
necticut law), aff'd, 370 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1034 (1967), and aff'd
sub nom. Urbano v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 370 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1966); Jackson v.
Longcope, 476 N.E.2d 617, 619-21 (Mass. 1985); Finklea v. Jacksonville Daily Progress, 742
S.W.2d 512, 517-18 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). In Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977), the Second Circuit refused to expand the doctrine beyond
its application to plaintiffs with criminal histories. Id. at 889. The court held that William F.
Buckley, despite having spent most of his life as a spokesman for controversial conservative
viewpoints, was not "libel-proof" as a matter of law. Id at 88 8-89. The publication in ques-
tion labeled Buckley as "a 'fellow traveler' of 'fascism,' " a "'deceiver'" who abused his posi-
tion as a journalist to propagate ideas from "'openly fascist journals'" under the guise of
responsible conservatism, and a person who practiced libelous journalism. Id. at 887. The
court stated that the libel-proof doctrine enunciated in Cardillo "is a limited, narrow one,
which we will leave confined to its basic factual context" in which the plaintiff is a habitual
criminal. Id at 889.
79. 516 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
80. Id at 743-44. Although the plaintiff sued on a theory of product disparagement, the
court held that "First Amendment considerations require application of the actual malice stan-
dard to product disparagement suits, at least when the plaintiff is a public figure." Id. at 744
n.4. As the court noted, the "label" of product disparagement versus defamation is irrelevant
when the constitutional standards are the same. Id at 743. In Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 492-93 (1984), the United States Supreme Court
applied the New York Times actual malice standard in a product disparagement case involving
a media defendant.
81. Simmons Ford, 516 F. Supp. at 744. The article concluded that based on its testing,
the car suffered from poor acceleration, low top speed, poor braking, poor handling, poor ride,
poor comfort and generally negative performance. Id.
82. Id at 745.
83. Id The article claimed that under federal safety standards, conventional vehicles must
provide life-saving protection to occupants in a 30-mile-per-hour barrier crash, a 30-mile-per-
hour rollover and a 20-mile-per-hour side impact from another car. Id. The article then
stated: "We believe any such crash would imperil the lives of persons inside these tiny, fragile,
plastic-bodied vehicles." Id. at 744-45 (citing Two Electric Cars, 40 CONSUMER REP. 596, 596
(1975)). The plaintiff alleged that the article was false because the mandatory requirements
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issue, the District Court for the Southern District of New York held that
"no reasonable jury could find with convincing clarity on the facts here
presented that defendant acted with actual malice."84
The district court, outlining one version of what would become
known as the incremental harm doctrine, extended the libel-proof doc-
trine that had been enunciated by the Second Circuit in Cardillo.8 5 The
court held that given the many other reasons stated in the article for
finding the car unsafe, the article's mischaracterization of the applicabil-
ity of the federal safety guidelines was not actionable as a matter of law. 6
The Second Circuit adopted a seemingly similar approach in Her-
bert v. Lando. 7 In Herbert the plaintiff, a retired Army officer, chal-
lenged eleven statements made about him in a weekly television news
program." Herbert claimed the Army had mistreated him because he
had charged his superiors with failing to investigate reports he had made
about war crimes and atrocities committed by the 173rd Airborne Bri-
gade in Vietnam.89 Lando produced a segment on the CBS newsma-
gazine "60 Minutes" titled "The Selling of Col. Herbert" casting doubt
on the validity of Herbert's charges.' Lando later wrote an article in the
did not exist as described by the article, and because the article had asserted that the electric
cars were temporarily exempt from "this allegedly nonexistent regulation." Id. at 745.
84. Id. at 747. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id. at
744.
85. As the court summarized the doctrine, "Cardillo is one of a series of cases in which a
libel claim by a plaintiff with an extensive criminal record was dismissed when the allegedly
false accusation launched against him is the commission of yet another crime." Id. at 750.
86. The court wrote:
Here, . . . the portion of the article challenged by plaintiffs, could not harm their
reputations in any way beyond the harm already caused by the remainder of the
article. It may be acknowledged the reputation of the CitiCar was damaged by de-
fendant's finding that CitiCar was "Not Acceptable." However, the blunt fact is
that, in light of defendant's extensive and detailed testing procedures, if the article
had made no reference to federal safety standards, or to the CitiCar's exemptions
from them, the opinions expressed therein upon which the defendant concluded the
car was "Not Acceptable" would not give rise to any actionable claim in plaintiffs'
favor. Given the abysmal performance and safety evaluations detailed in the article,
plaintiffs could not expect to gain more than nominal damages based on the addition
to the article of the misstatement relating to federal safety standards. As defendant
notes, "at the time the article was prepared, there was ample basis in fact to reach an
opinion that the CitiCar was unsafe and 'Not Acceptable,' even apart from the spe-
cific safety standards in question." Given this background, plaintiffs' reputational
interest in avoiding further adverse comment regarding the safety and performance
of CitiCar is minimal when compared with the First Amendment interests at stake.
Id. at 750-51 (quoting Two Electric Cars, 40 CONSUMER RP.- 596, 596 (1975)).
87. 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986).
88. Id. at 304.
89. Id. at 303.
90. Id.
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Atlantic Monthly about his investigation into Herbert's charges." The
article criticized not only Herbert but also the press, for accepting Her-
bert's charges against the Army at face value.92 Herbert then filed a def-
amation action against CBS, Lando, reporter Mike Wallace and the
Atlantic Monthly.93
The district court granted summary judgment as to nine statements
in the article and broadcast challenged by Herbert, finding no evidence
they had been made with actual malice.94 As to the other two state-
ments, the district court refused to apply the incremental harm branch of
the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine.9 The court distinguished Simmons
Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. 96 on the basis that
Herbert, "unlike the plaintiff in Simmons Ford, challenged not just one,
but many statements" in the publication. 97 The court ruled that a plain-
tiff who could not produce evidence of actual malice as to certain state-
ments was not necessarily conceding their truth, and therefore it would
be inequitable to preclude Herbert from producing evidence of actual
malice with respect to the remaining statements.98
On appeal, Judge Kaufman, writing for the Second Circuit, dis-
cussed the incremental harm doctrine, but declined to apply it.99 How-
ever, the court ruled:
[I]f the appellees' published view that Herbert lied about re-
porting war crimes was not actionable, other statements--even
those that might be found to have been published with actual
malice-should not be actionable if they merely imply the same
view, and are simply an outgrowth of and subsidiary to those
claims upon which it has been held there can be no recovery."°
91. Id at 304.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Herbert v. Lando, 596 F. Supp. 1178, 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986).
95. Herbert, 781 F.2d at 311.
96. 516 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
97. Herbert, 781 F.2d at 311.
98. Id
99. Id at 311 n.10 ("Some may view our holding today as a variation of the 'libel-proof'
doctrine, but we need not so characterize it."). Though the court insisted that it was not
applying the incremental harm doctrine, the case has been cited regularly by subsequent courts
and commentators discussing the doctrine. See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,
895 F.2d 1535, 1541 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Although the Herbert court denied that it was
applying the Simmons 'incremental harm' doctrine, it recognized that the test was very possi-
bly another variation of the 'libel proof' doctrine.").
100. Herbert, 781 F.2d at 312. The Second Circuit reversed the district court and ordered
summary judgment as to the remaining two statements at issue. Id.
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The court further noted:
[This holding] is thus limited to those cases in which statements
allegedly made with knowing falsity or reckless disregard give
rise to defamatory inferences that are only supportive of infer-
ences that are not actionable. For Herbert to base his defama-
tion action on subsidiary statements whose ultimate defamatory
implications are themselves not actionable, we believe, would
be a classic case of the tail wagging the dog.1"'
The incremental harm doctrine, in its broadest application, applies
when the challenged statement is not subsidiary to the unchallenged por-
tions. 102 This "core" '° version of the incremental harm doctrine holds
that summary judgment is appropriate if the harm caused by a chal-
101. Id. (footnote omitted). For purposes of this Note, this explication of the doctrine will
be labeled the "subsidiary statement" version of the incremental harm doctrine. This version
essentially deems a statement nonactionable if the statement is merely one of several other
damaging statements that support the ultimate proposition of the communication, which is not
challenged or is not actionable.
In another characterization of this approach, "the untrue and unprivileged statement is
merely a piece of evidence that would tend to prove a true and more damaging statement."
KEErON et al., supra note 27, § 116A, at 118 (5th ed. Supp. 1988). Keeton illustrates the
Herbert rule with the following hypothetical:
The libel is that plaintiff bought burglary tools and committed a burglary. The plain-
tiff did in fact commit a burglary but did not buy or use burglary tools. The untruth
of the statement about tools seems irrelevant when its only function would be as
evidence of the burglary-which was true.
Id. at 119 n.49.45.
102. See Comment, supra note 49, at 1912-13 (defining incremental harm doctrine simply
in terms of whether challenged statement "harms a plaintiff's reputation far less than the
unchallenged statements in the same article or broadcast"). That Comment did not distin-
guish situations in which the challenged statement is on a different topic than the remainder of
the article from those in which the challenged statement is merely "subsidiary" to other state-
ments. However, the Comment did cite Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), as the source of the rule. Arguably, however,
Simmons Ford involved an application of the subsidiary-statement version of the rule. As the
court noted, "'at the time the article was prepared, there was ample basis in fact to reach an
opinion that the CitiCar was unsafe and "Not Acceptable," even apart from the specific safety
standards in question.'" Id. at 750-51 (quoting Affidavit of Robert D. Knoll, paragraph 31).
In effect, the reference to safety standards was "subsidiary" to the conclusion that the car was
"unsafe and 'Not Acceptable." Thus the Simmons decision, although it is commonly cited as
the primogenitor of the incremental harm doctrine, in fact was the forerunner of Herbert,
which disavowed the incremental harm doctrine and elucidated the alternative "subsidiary-
statement" rationale. Herbert, 781 F.2d at 311 & n.10.
103. This broad application of the doctrine will be labeled the "core" version for purposes
of this Note, to distinguish it from the subsidiary-statement variant, and because this defini-
tion, or some variation of it, is generally offered by courts discussing the incremental harm
doctrine. See, e.g., Sharon v. Time, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1162, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Simmons
Ford, 516 F. Supp. at 750; Gannett Co. v. Re, 496 A.2d 553, 557 (Del. 1985); Finklea v.
Jacksonville Daily Progress, 742 S.W.2d 512, 516-17 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); Langston v. Eagle
Publishing Co., 719 S.W.2d 612, 622 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
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lenged statement--even one on a topic different from the unchallenged
statements-is trivial compared with the amount of harm caused by the
unchallenged or nonactionable portion of the publication. 04 In Herbert
the Second Circuit declined to decide whether it would apply the incre-
mental harm doctrine where the challenged statement addresses a differ-
ent subject than other damaging statements in the same publication.105
C. Criticism of the Incremental Harm Doctrine
1. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson
The libel-proof plaintiff doctrine (including the incremental harm
branch) has not met with universal acceptance. Both branches of the
doctrine were rejected by the District of Columbia Circuit in Liberty
Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson." 6 The case arose from a series of articles that
appeared in the October 1981 issue of The Investigator.10 7 The articles
conveyed an impression of Willis Carto, founder of Liberty Lobby, a
non-profit corporation, as a racist, fascist, anti-Semite and neo-Nazi.'0 8
They also conveyed the impression that Liberty Lobby had been created
to pursue his goals." 9 Carto and Liberty Lobby sued, charging that the
104. For approval of application of the incremental harm doctrine in such situations, see
Comment, supra note 49, at 1925 ("When a plaintiff challenges statements that damage his
reputation substantially less than that caused by other, unchallenged statements in the same
communication, common sense... requires dismissal of the suit."). That Comment cited as
the "easiest" case for a libel defendant to make under this version of the doctrine a communi-
cation calling the plaintiff a murderer, a rapist and a reckless driver, where the plaintiff chal-
lenges only the last statement. Id. Examples of hard cases would include determining whether
a statement calling a plaintiff a "child molester" in addition to a "rapist" causes significant or
only incremental damage to the plaintiff's reputation. Id.
105. Herbert, 781 F.2d at 312. Although the court carefully limited its holding, one com-
mentator has attacked the Herbert subsidiary-statement version of the rule, asserting that in
Herbert, "the Second Circuit adopted an expansive form of the incremental branch." David
Marder, Comment, Libel Proof Plaintiffs-Rabble Without a Cause, 67 B.U. L. REv. 993,
1004 (1987).
106. 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
107. The first article was written by Jack Anderson; the other two were written by Charles
Bermant, a staff writer. Id at 1566.
108. Id at 1567.
109. Id The plaintiffs alleged that 28 specific statements from the three articles, plus two
illustrations, were defamatory. Id at 1567-68. The circuit court, in its opening discussion,
discussed several of them. One article stated that following the death of Francis Parker
Yockey, a lawyer and author who took his own life in 1960, Carto was able to "'pick up the
torch [of racism] and fan it into a prairie fire.'" Id. at 1567. Carto's strategy "'[t]o capture
political power' was 'to put a benign face on his operation.... Thus Carto called his base
organization Liberty Lobby.'" Id Another article asked rhetorical questions such as whether
"'Carto's opinions march goosesteps beyond the pale of responsible American conserva-
tism?'" Id. The article also repeated claims that Carto was "'the leading anti-Semite in the
1498
INCREMENTAL HARM DOCTRINE
articles had libeled them.110
The District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants.111 The court found that based on
the thoroughness of the research and the number of sources relied upon
in the articles, there was an insufficient showing of actual malice to sus-
tain a libel suit.1 2 The court declined to decide whether Carto and Lib-
erty Lobby were libel proof, either under the incremental harm or the
libel-proof plaintiff doctrine." 3
Judge Scalia, writing for the Court of Appeals, commented that the
incremental harm doctrine has been applied where "the unchallenged
portions of these articles attribute to the appellants characteristics so
much worse than those attributed in the challenged portions, that the
latter cannot conceivably do any incremental damage."'" 4 The court,
however, rejected the doctrine, stating:
This apparently equitable theory loses most of its equity when
one realizes that the reason the unchallenged portions are un-
challenged may not be that they are true, but only that appel-
lants were unable to assert that they were willfully false. In any
event, the theory must be rejected because it rests upon the as-
sumption that one's reputation is a monolith, which stands or
falls in its entirety. The law, however, proceeds upon the opti-
mistic premise that there is a little bit of good in all of us--or
perhaps upon the pessimistic assumption that no matter how
bad someone is, he can always be worse. It is shameful that
Benedict Arnold was a traitor; but he was not a shoplifter to
boot, and one should not have been able to make that charge
while knowing its falsity with impunity. So also here. Even if
some of the deficiencies of philosophy or practice which the ap-
pellees' articles are lawfully permitted to attribute to the appel-
lants (which is not necessarily to say they are true) are in fact
much more derogatory than the statements under challenge,
the latter cannot be said to be harmless. Even the public out-
cast's remaining good reputation, limited in scope though it
country.'" Id. Both in words and illustrations, the article claimed that Carto "'resembled
and emulated the mannerisms of Hitler.'" Id.
110. Id.
111. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 562 F. Supp. 201, 204 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
112. Id. at 209.
113. Id. at 209 n.12.
114. Liberty Lobby, 746 F.2d at 1568.
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may be, is not inconsequential.1 15
2. The substantial truth defense
Somewhat related to the incremental harm doctrine is the substan-
tial truth defense. This defense allows a defendant to maintain that an
allegedly defamatory statement, "although not literally true in every de-
tail, is substantially true in its implication."116 It holds that a publication
may be substantially true despite minor inaccuracies, and thus not ac-
tionable, if the "gist" or "sting" of the publication is true. 17 It has been
asserted that the incremental harm doctrine is essentially the same as the
substantial truth defense, and that the incremental harm doctrine is thus
redundant and irrelevant.'
It is true that there is some overlap between the subsidiary-state-
ment version of the incremental harm doctrine and the substantial truth
doctrine. Thus, when challenged statements "merely imply the same
view",I" as statements in the same publication that are true and therefore
nonactionable, the challenged statements may be said to be nonaction-
able because they are "subsidiary" to the other statements, 120 or because
the publication is "substantially true."' 121 However, a different situation
occurs when both the challenged and unchallenged statements are false,
with the sole difference being that the plaintiff cannot prove actual malice
as to the unchallenged statements. In this case, the challenged state-
ments might still be "subsidiary" to the unchallenged statements, and
therefore potentially nonactionable under the subsidiary-statement vari-
115. I d
116. Wynberg v. National Enquirer, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 924, 927 (C.D. Cal. 1982); see also
Gannett Co. v. Re, 496 A.2d 553, 557 (Del. 1985) (discussing doctrine of substantial truth).
117. Gannett, 496 A.2d at 557; KEETON et al., supra note 27, § 116, at 842.
118. Marder, supra note 105, at 1015-16. Another commentator has essentially equated the
two doctrines, writing that:
[W]hile the incremental harm doctrine has been cited as a branch of libel-proof plain-
tiff doctrine, in fact it is closely related to the issue of substantial truth, and is indeed
simply another variation of the principle that liability of defamation cannot exist
when the "gist" or "sting" of the defamatory statement is not actionable.
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 5.08[3], at 5-17 (Release No. 5, 1992). How-
ever, Smolla cites only Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182
(1986) and Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 881 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S.
Ct. 2419 (1991) in his discussion of the incremental harm doctrine. SMOLLA, supra, § 5.08[3],
at 5-17; id. § 5.11[2], at 5-22 to 5-22.1. At the time, Masson was the only circuit court decision
that had adopted the incremental harm doctrine. The Herbert court adopted only the subsidi-
ary-statement variant. Arguably, only the subsidiary statement variant overlaps significantly
with the substantial truth doctrine. See infra notes 119-22.
119. Herbert, 781 F.2d at 312.
120. Id.
121. See, eg., Wynberg, 564 F. Supp. at 927.
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ant of the incremental harm rule. But the publication could not be said
to be "substantially true."
Finally, when the challenged statements are on a different subject
than the unchallenged or nonactionable statements, there is never any
overlap with the substantial truth doctrine.
1 22
D. Other Courts' Discussion of the Incremental Harm Doctrine
Invocation of the incremental harm doctrine has been relatively
rare. Among the federal circuits, prior to the Supreme Court's decision
in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. ,123 only the Ninth Circuit had
formally adopted the incremental harm branch of the doctrine.
1 24
122. The substantial truth defense rests on an assumption that a minor detail can be wrong
if the overall thrust of the article as a whole supports the implication of the challenged state-
ment. See, eg., id at 924. This is also true in subsidiary-statement situations. See Herbert,
781 F.2d 298 at 311; see also Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,
516 F. Supp. 742, 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding article supported car's "Not Acceptable"
rating regardless of falsity of statements at issue). But it is not true in core incremental-harm
situations. For example, in Crane v. Arizona Republic, 729 F. Supp. 698 (C.D. Cal. 1989), the
two plaintiffs were the subject of a House of Representatives probe into their alleged ties to
organized crime. Id at 699. The plaintiffs sued over an article that contained two sets of
allegedly libelous statements: the first involved reports about the investigation, id. at 703-07,
and the second contained statements by the plaintiffs denying knowledge of the investigation,
id. 707-08. The plaintiffs claimed that the second set of statements, without explanatory infor-
mation, created a libelous implication that one of them was lying about his knowledge of the
investigation. Id at 707. The court granted the newspaper summary judgment as to the first
set of statements, finding they were a fair and true report of an official public proceeding. Id.
at 708. The court noted that such a report need only be substantially true, not true in every
detail, to be protected by the privilege. Id at 704. The court granted the newspaper summary
judgment as to the second set of statements under the incremental harm doctrine, stating that
"[t]he possible inference that may be drawn by the reader that either Henderson or Crane was
lying about his knowledge of the investigation does not impugn either plaintiff's reputation
beyond the damage already suffered as a result of the privileged report of the House Select
Committee proceedings." Id. at 707. In this core incremental-harm situation, a finding that
the first set of statements is substantially true would have no bearing on whether the second set
of statements is potentially actionable.
In some situations the challenged and unchallenged statements may be on seemingly dif-
ferent topics and yet still imply the same view. This can happen in two ways-first, when the
article taken as a whole conveys a defamatory implication that the separate statements alone
do not convey. For example, one statement states that the plaintiff was on the coner of Main
and Elm at noon on January 1, and also states that a robbery was committed at Main and Elm
at noon on January 1. The two statements are on seemingly different subjects, yet the overall
implication could be that the plaintiff was somehow involved. In the second scenario, the two
statements might be on the same or different issues, depending on the level of abstraction at
which they are interpreted. For instance, statements that a person is a rapist and a child
molester might be on different topics; or they might both convey the impression of the person
as a sexual criminal. Because of this problem, the subsidiary-statement variant is theoretically
open to a certain amount of manipulation.
123. 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
124. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989) rev'd, 111 S. Ct.
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Aside from Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 25 the incremental
harm doctrine has been discussed in only fourteen other cases.12 6 Of
these, eleven were subsequent to Liberty Lobby:12 7 seven were federal
cases, representing four jurisdictions,'28 and the other four were state-
court cases.
129
In three reported decisions after Liberty Lobby-one federal and
two state-the incremental harm doctrine was invoked to dismiss some
or all of the plaintiff's libel claims.130 In addition, one unreported case
has relied on the doctrine to dismiss claims. 3' Two of these cases were
applications of the subsidiary-statement version of the doctrine; 132 one
2419 (1991). This tabulation does not include the Second Circuit's holding in Herbert. The
Second Circuit in that case asserted that it was not applying the incremental harm doctrine.
Herbert, 781 F.2d at 311 n.10.
125. 746 F.2d 1563, 1568-69 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242
(1986). For a discussion of Liberty Lobby see supra notes 107-16 and accompanying text.
126. This number includes Masson and Herbert.
127. The three cases that were decided prior to Liberty Lobby were Sharon v. Time, Inc.,
575 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc., 516 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), and Turner v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 5 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 1437, 1437-39 (W.D. Ky. 1979). Discussions of the libel-proof plaintiff doc-
trine after Liberty Lobby are significant because this was the first case to offer criticism of the
doctrine, and as such it changed the terms of the discussion. It is noteworthy that a few courts
have continued to accept and apply the doctrine.
128. The cases, grouped by jurisdiction, were: (1) in the Southern District of New York,
Galu v. SwissAir, No. 86 Civ. 5551, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12628 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1987);
Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 313 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 800 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.
1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987); and Herbert v. Lando, No. 74 Civ. 434-CSH slip op.
(S.D.N.Y. April 4, 1985), rev'd, 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986); (2)
in the District of New Jersey, Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 1511 (D.N.J.
1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 847 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1988); (3) in the Northern District of
California, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1397 (N.D. Cal. 1987),
aff'd, 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991); and (4) in the Central
District of California, Dorsey v. National Enquirer, Inc., No. CV 89-0209, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6084 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 1990); and Crane v. Arizona Republic, 729 F. Supp. 698 (C.D.
Cal. 1989). In Guccione the district court held that the incremental harm doctrine was not
applicable to the case. Guccione, 632 F. Supp. at 323-24. The Second Circuit, in reversing the
district court's refusal to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict, held that the plaintiff
was libel proof and that the article at issue was substantially true. Guccione, 800 F.2d 298,
303-04 (2d Cir. 1986).
129. Gannett Co. v. Re, 496 A.2d 553 (Del. 1985); Jackson v. Longcope, 476 N.E.2d 617
(Mass. 1985); Finldea v. Jacksonville Daily Progress, 742 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987);
Langston v. Eagle Publishing Co., 719 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
130. See Crane, 729 F. Supp. at 707; Jackson, 476 N.E.2d at 621; Finklea, 742 S.W.2d at
517-18. Although the Jackson court did not explicitly invoke the incremental harm branch of
the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, it implicitly applied it by suggesting that by ignoring the
statements made in the larger portion of the article, the plaintiff had "concede[d]" their truth.
131. Dorsey, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6084, at *14-15.
132. Id. at *15; Finklea, 742 S.W.2d at 518.
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cited Herbert v. Lando 133 but did not actually involve the subsidiary
statement rule. 134 In three cases-one federal and two state-the court
found both the issue-specific and incremental harm branches of the libel-
proof plaintiff doctrine applicable.
135
E. Definitions of the Incremental Harm Doctrine
The incremental harm doctrine has suffered from a lack of clearness.
Although definitions of the doctrine vary only slightly from court to
court, even these slight differences reveal a lack of clarity about the rule.
One commentator defined the doctrine as barring libel awards "when an
article or broadcast contains highly damaging statements, but the plain-
tiff challenges only a minor assertion in the communication as false and
defamatory."
' 136
In Gannett Co. v. Re' 3 7 the Delaware Supreme Court defined the
rule as follows: "The question of whether a particular defendant is libel
proof is resolved by an examination of whether or not the faulty portion
of the article complained of can be said to have damaged plaintiff's repu-
tation beyond the harm already inflicted by the remainder of the arti-
cle."' 13  In Langston v. Eagle Publishing Co. 39 the court stated that
under the incremental harm doctrine, "[w]hen the plaintiff challenges
certain statements in a communication, which damage his reputation far
less than the damage necessarily inflicted on his reputation by other un-
challenged statements in the same communication, the incremental libel-
proof doctrine bars his libel claim."'" Similarly, in Finklea v. Jackson-
133. 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986).
134. Crane, 729 F. Supp. at 707. The statements at issue-which implied that one of the
two subjects of the article was lying about his knowledge of an investigation into the pair's
alleged ties to organized crime-were different from the subject of the overall article, which
was about the investigation itself. Id. at 700-01. The statements dismissed under the incre-
mental harm doctrine therefore were not "subsidiary" to the other parts of the article deemed
nonactionable.
135. See Schiavone, 646 F. Supp. at 1515; Jackson, 476 N.E.2d at 619-21; Finklea, 742
S.W.2d at 516-17.
136. See Comment, supra note 49, at 1909.
137. 496 A.2d 553 (Del. 1985).
138. Id at 557. Under the court's definition, the incremental harm doctrine would not bar
a suit if the challenged portion of the communication damaged the plaintiff's reputation even a
scintilla beyond the unchallenged portion-a narrow reading of the incremental harm
doctrine.
139. 719 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
140. Id. at 622 (emphasis added). Under this broader reading of the rule, a plaintiff may
sustain some actual injury beyond that sustained because of the nonactionable portion of the
publication, yet still be barred from bringing suit. The Langston court also incorporated the
"issue specific" branch of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine: "Repeated, untested and widely-
distributed negative publicity about the plaintiff, regarding the same subject or issue as the
June 1992] 1503
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
ville Daily Progress 14 1 the court noted that courts have applied the incre-
mental harm doctrine
when the plaintiff challenges statements substantially less dam-
aging to his reputation than other unchallenged statements in
the same communication. By implicitly conceding the truth of
the overwhelmingly derogatory portion of the statements, the
plaintiff himself conclusively demonstrates that he had no re-
maining reputation in the matters touched on by the challenged
statement. 
142
These variations suggest, at the least, that courts have not yet agreed
on whether the doctrine applies when the challenged statement damages
the plaintiff substantially less than the nonactionable statements, or when
the challenged statement cannot be said to damage plaintiff's reputation
at all beyond the damage done by the nonactionable portion. Although
it is a seemingly subtle distinction, it reveals a certain level of confusion
about the exact meaning of the rule and its underlying rationale. It was
against this somewhat murky backdrop that the Ninth Circuit became
the latest proponent of the doctrine.
IV. MASSON v NEW YORKER MAGAZIN, INa
A. Factual Background
In 1983 Janet Malcolm published a two-part article in The New
Yorker magazine about Jeffrey M. Masson. 143 Masson had been fired
from his position as Projects Director of the Sigmund Freud Archives. 14"
The article was based largely on Malcolm's tape-recorded interviews
with Masson.14 5
Malcolm described the struggle between Masson and other board
members of the Archives, including Dr. Kurt Eissler and Dr. Anna
Freud (Sigmund Freud's daughter), over Sigmund Freud's abandonment
of the "seduction theory.""' This theory assumes that certain mental
illnesses originate in sexual abuse during childhood.'4 7 Malcolm wrote
challenged communication, will bar his libel action under the issue-specific branch of the doc-
trine." Id. at 621.
141. 742 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
142. Id. at 516-17 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
143. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1397 (N.D. Cal. 1987),
af'd, 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1536 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111




about Masson's claim that his contract with the Archives had been ter-
minated because he "went public" with his views that Freud abandoned
the seduction theory simply to further his career and placate his col-
leagues."' The articles were later published as a book by Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc.149 According to the United States Supreme Court, the arti-
cles portrayed Masson in "a most unflattering light." '
On November 29, 1984, Masson filed a diversity action in federal
court against Malcolm, The New Yorker and Knopf,' Masson con-
tended the defendants had libeled him in violation of Section 45 of the
California Civil Code.' 52
Masson sued over several specific passages from the articles that
purported to quote statements made by him during the interviews.
1 53
During the course of discovery, Masson amended his complaint several
times, concentrating on various passages, dropping some and adding
others. 1
5 4
The case was unique because Masson was challenging not the words
of another person about him, but his own (purported) words, as reported
by Malcolm. Masson claimed that the statements had been published
with actual malice 155 because Malcolm had "deliberately fabricat[ed]
quotations ascribed to him."'5 6 As evidence of the deliberate fabrication,
Masson presented evidence that several quotations attributed to him did
not appear in the tape recordings of his conversations with Malcolm, that
Malcolm herself had altered quotations, and that he had alerted the staff
at The New Yorker that the quotations had been altered before publica-
148. Id.
149. Id
150. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2425 (1991).
151. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1536.
152. The statute states: "Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing ... which
exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which has a tendency to injure
him in his occupation." CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West 1982).
153. Masson claimed that the article's misquotations falsely portrayed him as "'unscho-
larly, irresponsible, vain, [and] lacking impersonal [sic] honesty and moral integrity.'" Mas-
son, 895 F.2d at 1536.
154. The Supreme Court explained: "The tape recordings of the interviews demonstrated
that [Masson] had, in fact, made statements substantially identical to a number of the passages,
and those passages are no longer in the case." Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2425.
155. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Supreme Court held that
to sustain a libel action, public officials must show that a statement was made with "actual
malice," defined as "knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not." Id. at 280. This standard was later extended to public-figure plaintiffs in Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
156. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1537.
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tion.l s7 Masson challenged ten quotations""8 in the article.
First, Malcolm quoted Masson as stating that he had changed his
middle name from Lloyd to Moussaieff because" 'it sounded better.' "59
On the tape recordings, Masson stated that he changed his middle name
to Moussaieff because, among other things, he "'just liked it.' ,,s'
Masson was quoted as stating that Freud's "'entire theory after he
abandoned seduction was the product of moral cowardice.' "161 On the
transcript, Masson merely said that he felt Freud had "'lost his
courage.' "162
Malcolm quoted Masson as stating that had he been allowed to live
in Anna Freud's house in London, the house would not only have been
"a place of scholarship, but it would also have been a place of sex, wo-
men, [and] fun." 163  In the transcripts, there were passages in which
Masson said that the police would be called every time he gave a party
and that he "could have had some fun." In other passages, he boasted
about his sexual prowess.'64
Malcolm quoted Masson as predicting that after the release of a
book he had written, analysts would say "after Freud, [Masson's] the
greatest analyst who ever lived."' 65 Those precise words did not appear
in the taped interviews; however, the interviews did include statements
such as "'for better or for worse, analysis stands or falls with me
now.... [I]t's me and Freud against the rest of the analytic world ....
157. Ia
158. These statements are presented in the order used in the Ninth Circuit decision. In a
previous ruling, the district court granted summary judgment on four other statements that
Masson had challenged. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1397
(N.D. Cal. 1987), aff'd, 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
159. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1539-40.
160. Id at 1540. The district court held that the discrepancy between Masson's words on
the tape and those attributed to him in the article was "not [enough] to raise a triable [issue] of
fact on the issue of actual malice." Masson, 686 F. Supp. at 1399. The Ninth Circuit agreed,
stating that it could not "perceive any substantive difference" between the two phrases, and
that Malcolm had not altered the "substantive content" of the statement. Masson, 895 F.2d at
1540.
161. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1541.
162. Id Again, the district court and the Ninth Circuit found that the phrase "moral cow-
ardice" was a "rational interpretation" of Masson's comments. Masson, 686 F. Supp. at 1402;
Masson, 895 F.2d at 1541. According to the circuit court, Malcolm had not altered the "sub-
stantive content" of the quote. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1542.
163. Masson, 686 F. Supp. at 1404.
164. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1542. The district court held that the disputed passage of the
publication was substantially true because "the sting of the passage is the same as that of
undisputed tape-recorded passages." Masson, 686 F. Supp. at 1405. The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed, finding that there was not sufficient proof of malice. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1542.
165. Masson, 686 F. Supp. at 1405.
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Not so, it's me. It's me alone.' ,166
During the interviews, Masson told Malcolm about a paper he had
delivered at an analyst's convention "in which he criticized Freud for the
alleged 'sterility of psychoanalysis.' "167 In the article, Masson was
quoted as stating: "'That remark about the sterility of psychoanalysis
was something I tacked on at the last minute, and it was totally gratui-
tous. I don't know why I put it in.' "16 Again, the exact quotation was
not in the taped interviews.'69
In a complex discussion of what Freud knew at the time he wrote a
case study of a man named Daniel Sehreber, Malcolm quoted Masson as
referring to "'my discovery about the Schreber case.' "170 These words
did not appear in the taped interviews. 7' Masson claimed that most in-
formed readers would know that the discoveries were made by another
analyst.'7 2 Thus, the fictionalization of this quotation made it appear
that he was taking credit for someone else's discovery, when in fact he
had only claimed to be taking the discovery one step further.173
Malcolm quoted Masson in the article as stating that "'tlhere
aren't too many interpretations possible of [my] discovery,"' and that
"'[Dr. Kurt] Eissler would have admitted... [I] was right' "in his belief
about Freud's knowledge in the Schreber case.'74 Masson claimed that
his statement that there were not too many interpretations possible of his
discovery had been taken out of context. He also denied saying that
Eissler would have admitted he was right and claimed that the passage
166. Id. Given the "many egotistical and boastful statements" made by Masson, the dis-
trict court held that a reasonable jury could not find evidence that Malcolm "entertained seri-
ous doubts about the accuracy of the passage." Id at 1406. The Ninth Circuit affirmed,
saying that "[t]he purportedly fictionalized quotation actually reflects the substance of Mas-
son's self-appraisal." Masson, 895 F.2d at 1542.
167. Masson, 686 F. Supp. at 1403.
168. Id.
169. Id Given other statements Masson had made, however, the district court held that
the passage was a "rational interpretation" of Masson's comments. Id. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed, holding that "the words attributed to Masson did not alter the substantive content"
of Masson's statements. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1543.
170. Masson, 686 F. Supp. at 1401.
171. Id
172. Id
173. Id. The district court found that Malcolm clearly indicated in the article the aspect of
the "discovery" for which Masson was taking credit. The court further held that a reasonable
jury could not "find by clear and convincing evidence that Malcolm entertained serious doubts
about the truth of the printed material." Id. The Ninth Circuit again affirmed, holding that
Malcolm's quotation had not altered the substance of Masson's comments. Masson, 895 F.2d
at 1544.
174. Masson, 686 F. Supp. at 1402.
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"'furthered the false image of Masson as a vain egotist.' "175
Malcolm quoted Masson as declaring, "'Denise worries too
much"' in response to his girlfriend's complaint that he did not feel the
"'pain' "that he had caused Dr. Eissler.1 76 Masson contended that Mal-
colm had fabricated this response, and that the passage made Masson
appear careless and indifferent to the feelings of those he loved. 177 The
tape showed that Masson actually had responded to his girlfriend's com-
plaint by stating that he was not personally "close" to Eissler.178
One disputed passage made it appear that Masson had asserted that
Eissler "'had the wrong man'" if he expected Masson to do something
honorable. 179 Although the actual quote was accurate, part of the quote
had been deleted, thus altering the meaning of the passage.
1 80
Malcolm quoted Masson as stating, in discussing an affair with a
graduate student:
"She [the graduate student] said, 'Well, it is very nice sleeping
with you in your room, but you're the kind of person who
should never leave the room-you're just a social embarrass-
ment anywhere else, though you do fine in your own room.'
175. Id The district court noted that certain conversations on the tapes were "ambiguous"
and that the quoted passage was a "rational interpretation" of those conversations. Id. at
1403. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the passage was a "rational interpretation" of
Masson's ambiguous remarks. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1544.
176. Masson, 686 F. Supp. at 1404.
177. Ia
178. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1544. The district court granted Malcolm summary judgment,
because Masson failed to present "clear and convincing evidence that Malcolm entertained
serious doubts about the truth" of the allegedly fictionalized response. Masson, 686 F. Supp.
at 1404. The court also noted that Masson admitted he had expressed the belief in the past
that his girlfriend worried too much. Id The district court concluded that Masson's allega-
tion concerning the passage was "triviality to the highest degree." Id. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed, on the grounds that "the purported fictionalization ... did not constitute a substan-
tive alteration of the response Masson claims he made." Masson, 895 F.2d at 1544.
179. Masson, 686 F. Supp. at 1400.
180. Malcolm wrote that Eissler had put pressure on Masson to keep quiet about his discov-
eries about Freud because of their potential effects on Anna Freud. Id. at 1399. After quoting
Masson recounting how Eissler had told Masson that he should keep quiet because "'it is the
honorable thing to do,"' Malcolm quoted Masson as stating, "'Well, he had the wrong
man.'" Id at 1400. Masson contended that "the quoted passage suggests that he was unwill-
ing to remain silent in order to do the honorable thing; when, in fact, he meant that he was
unwilling to remain silent in the hopes of getting his position back." Id. The district court
held that the way Malcolm had quoted the discussion on the tapes was "a proper exercise of
literary license." Id. The court held that although there was an issue of triable fact as to the
quotation's "substantial truth," "no question of fact exists on the issue of actual malice." Id.
The Ninth Circuit found that Masson's remarks were ambiguous, and the statement as it ap-




And, you know, in their way, if not in so many words, Eissler and
Anna Freud told me the same thing. They like me well enough
'in my own room.' They loved to hear from me what creeps and
dolts analysts are. I was like an intellectual gigolo--you get
your pleasure from him, but you don't take him out in
public. "181
The court noted that the italicized portion of the quote did not ap-
pear in the tape recordings, though it did appear in Malcolm's interview
notes.'1 2 Masson contended that the notes were fabricated. 183 The dis-
trict court assumed for the purposes of summary judgment that Masson
had not referred to himself as an "intellectual gigolo."' 84 The court
noted, however, that the tapes contained the following comment:
[Eissler and Anna Freud] felt, in a sense, I was a private asset
but a public liability. They like[d] me when I was alone in their
living room, and I could talk and chat and tell them the truth
about things and they would tell me. But that I was, in a sense,
much too junior within the hierarchy of analysis, for these im-
portant training analysts to be caught dead with me.
181
The district court found that "Malcolm's use of the descriptive term
'intellectual gigolo' was a rational interpretation of [these] comments."186
As a result, the court found that malice could not be inferred from the
quote.18 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that "[w]hile it may be
true that Masson did not use the words 'intellectual gigolo,' Malcolm's
interpretation did not alter the substantive content of Masson's descrip-
tion of himself as a 'private asset but a public liability' to Eissler and
Anna Freud."'
88
However, the Ninth Circuit went further than the district court,
holding that this quotation was not even defamatory. It reasoned that "a
fair reading of the quotation shows author Malcolm is portraying Mas-
181. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1540.
182. Id.
183. Masson, 686 F. Supp. at 1400.
184. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1540.
185. Id. In a footnote, the Ninth Circuit noted that other portions of the taped interviews
revealed that Masson had "repeatedly boasted of his ability to seduce or 'charm' the senior
analysts, including Kurt Eissler and Anna Freud." Id. at 1540 n.4. The court also noted that
although the phrase "intellectual gigolo" had sexual connotations, which, according to Mas-
son, his taped comments did not, "it also appears that on at least one occasion Masson himself
employed sexual metaphors to describe his and other young analysts' relationships with
Eissler." I&
186. Masson, 686 F. Supp. at 1400-01.
187. Id.
188. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1541.
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son as reporting Kurt Eissler's and Anna Freud's opinions about him.
As such, it is difficult to perceive how the quotation is defamatory." 189
The majority then found, alternatively, that the quotation was "non-
defamatory under the 'incremental harm branch' of the 'libel-proof'
doctrine." 190
The court held that "[g]iven the general tenor of the article and the
many provocative, bombastic statements indisputably made by Masson
and quoted by Malcolm, the additional harm caused by the 'intellectual
gigolo' quote was nominal or nonexistent, rendering the defamation
claim as to this quote non-actionable." 191
B. The Supreme Court Decision
Masson appealed the Ninth Circuit's dismissal of his suit regarding
five of the challenged statements-"Intellectual Gigolo," "Sex, Women,
Fun," "It Sounded Better," "I Don't Know Why I Put It In," and
"Greatest Analyst Who Ever Lived."192 The United States Supreme
Court rejected the lower courts' application of the "rational interpreta-
tion" test. 193 Instead, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, created
189. Id. In dissent, Judge Kozinski wrote that "[f]or an academic to refer to himself as an
intellectual gigolo is such a devastating admission of professional dishonesty that a jury could
well conclude that it is libelous." Id. at 1551 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 1541. The circuit court invoked the incremental harm doctrine despite the fact
that neither party had argued the issue. Id. at 1565 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). The defendants,
in their brief in opposition to certiorari to the Supreme Court, did maintain that the doctrine
was part of California law, relying on Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 244,
690 P.2d 610, 208 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1984), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1009 (1986). Brief in Opposi-
tion to Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit at 28, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 89-
1799), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
In his dissent in Masson, however, Ninth Circuit Judge Kozinski asserted that the trend
in California cannot be reconciled with the incremental harm doctrine. Masson, 895 F.2d at
1565 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Judge Kozinski relied on a California Supreme Court case
stating that to decide whether a statement is one of fact or opinion, a court must consider the
publication in its entirety and not treat each portion of the publication as a separate unit. Id.
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d 254, 261,
721 P.2d 87, 91, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206, 209-10 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1032 (1987)).
191. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1541. Under the court's definition, the incremental harm doctrine
"measures the incremental reputational harm inflicted by the challenged statements beyond
the harm imposed by the nonactionable remainder of the publication; if that 'incremental
harm' is determined to be nominal or nonexistent, the statements are dismissed as non-actiona-
ble." Id. (citing Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298, 310-11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182
(1986); Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 742
(S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
192. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2425-29 (1991). The Supreme
Court granted certiorari in October 1990. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct.
39 (1990).
193. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2433.
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a new test to be used when defendants are accused of altering quotations:
"[A] deliberate alteration of the words uttered by a plaintiff does not
equate with knowledge of falsity unless the alteration results in a
material change in the meaning conveyed by the statement."1 94 Apply-
ing this test, the Court held that "the evidence creates a jury question
whether Malcolm published the statements with knowledge or reckless
disregard of the alterations." 195
As to the "intellectual gigolo" quotation, the Court disagreed with
the Ninth Circuit, holding that the quote was actionable.'96 The Court
stated that the passage could be defamatory because "[ain admission that
two well-respected senior colleagues considered one an 'intellectual gig-
olo' could be as or more damaging than a similar self-appraisal."'
1 97
Turning to the Ninth Circuit's alternative "incremental harm" hold-
ing, the Court, quoting the Ninth Circuit dissent, held that "the most
'provocative, bombastic statements' quoted by Malcolm are those com-
plained of by petitioner, and so this would not seem an appropriate appli-
cation of the incremental harm doctrine."' 98 Further, the Court rejected
"any suggestion that the incremental harm doctrine is compelled as a
matter of First Amendment protection for speech." 19 9 The Court left the
matter to state tort law, noting that "state tort law doctrines of injury,
causation, and damages calculation might allow a defendant to press the
argument that the statements did not result in any incremental harm to a
plaintiff's reputation."
206
C. The Decision on Remand
On remand, Judge Kozinski, writing for the Ninth Circuit, consid-
ered whether the incremental harm doctrine applied as a matter of state
law.20' The court cited Herbert v. Lando 20 2 for its definition of the core
incremental harm doctrine.2"3 The court stated that "California courts
194. Id
195. Id at 2437.
196. Id. at 2439.
197. Id. at 2437-38.
198. Id. at 2436 (quoting Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1566 (9th
Cir. 1989) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991)).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., No. 87-2665, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6152, at
*4-6 (9th Cir. Apr. 6, 1992).
202. 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986).
203. Masson, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6152, at *4 (citing Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298,
311 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986)).
June 1992] l151l
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:1483
have shown no interest in the incremental harm doctrine. ' 2°4 Citing
Judge Scalia's opinion in Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson,205 the unani-
mous court held:
Because it is not required by the First Amendment, because the
Supreme Court has severely undermined the case authority that
generated the doctrine in the first place, because the California
courts have never adopted it and because we believe the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court would agree with Judge Scalia that it is a
"bad idea," we conclude that the incremental harm doctrine is
not an element of California libel law. 20 6
V. APPLYING THE INCREMENTAL HARM DOCTRINE: APPROPRIATE
AND INAPPROPRIATE CONTEXTS
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. 207 ostensibly put an end to
consideration of the incremental harm doctrine as a matter of First
Amendment law.2 °8 In some ways, the incremental harm doctrine has
been a phantom doctrine-frequently discussed, but rarely actually in-
voked. 2°9 Given the confusing state of the doctrine and the way it was
applied by the Ninth Circuit,210 the impact of the Supreme Court's hold-
ing is likely to be limited.
204. Id at *5. The court noted that only one California court had mentioned the doctrine.
Id (citing Weller v. American Broadcasting Cos., 232 Cal. App. 3d 991, 283 Cal. Rptr. 644
(1991)). In Weller v. American Broadcasting Cos., 232 Cal. App. 3d 991, 283 Cal. Rptr. 644
(1991) the appellate court declined to address the issue of whether the trial court erred in not
instructing the jury on the doctrine, finding the issue had been waived. Id. at 1010, 283 Cal.
Rptr. at 656. The court did not discuss Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d
254, 721 P.2d 87, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1032 (1987). Judge Kozin-
ski pointed to Baker in his earlier Masson dissent as an indication that California leans in the
"opposite direction" from the doctrine. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1565 (Kozinski, J., dissenting);
see supra note 190.
205. 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
206. Masson, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6152, at *6 (quoting Liberty Lobby, Inc., v. Ander-
son, 746 F.2d 1563, 1569 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986)).
The Ninth Circuit granted summary judgment in favor of Knopf but remanded the case for
trial as to Malcolm and The New Yorker. Id at *19-20. The court offered no support for its
contention that the California Supreme Court would agree with Judge Scalia's opinion in Lib-
erty Lobby. Rather, the court used the California courts' silence to support its own preference
for Judge Scalia's opinion. The circuit court did not analyze whether "state tort law doctrines
of injury, causation, and damages calculation might allow a defendant to press the argument
that the statements did not result in any incremental harm to a plaintiff's reputation." Masson
v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2436 (1991).
207. 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
208. Id at 2436.
209. See supra notes 124-36 and accompanying text.
210. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 11
S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
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The way the doctrine was handled, or mishandled, by the district
and circuit courts in Masson offers an illustration of how courts have
failed to come to terms with what the doctrine is, when it makes sense to
apply it and in what context it should be applied. Further, the courts
have failed to articulate how the different types of harm compensable by
defamation law cause different potential problems of causation, and how
the incremental harm doctrine, the substantial truth doctrine and the
subsidiary statement rule fit into these problems. This section addresses
these issues, and what role the incremental harm doctrine may still have
to play.
A. The Problem of Context in Masson
It is perhaps unfortunate that the incremental harm doctrine came
to the Court in the context of the Masson case, for as the Court itself
recognized, this was not the most appropriate case for application of the
doctrine.211 An objective consideration by the Court of the incremental
harm doctrine in this case would have been difficult because of the way
the lower courts had applied it.
The district court cited Herbert v. Lando ,212 which approved of a
separate analysis for each contested statement.21 3 The court wrote that
Herbert and Masson were similar in that "the defamatory impact of the
publication as a whole is the same as the defamatory implication con-
veyed by each of the individual statements."2 4 This analysis would im-
ply that the court was in effect applying the Herbert court's subsidiary-
statement approach. Yet the court never actually invoked the incremen-
211. "As noted by the dissent in the Court of Appeals, the most 'provocative, bombastic
statements' quoted by Malcolm are those complained of by [Masson], and so this would not
seem the most appropriate application of the incremental harm doctrine." Masson, 111 S. Ct.
at 2436 (1991) (citing Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1566 (9th Cir.
1989) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)).
212. 781 F.2d 298, 307 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986). The court in Herbert
distinguished between cases in which the overall impact of the article is defamatory even
though each separate statement taken by itself might not be, and cases in which the defama-
tory implication of each statement and of the article as a whole is the same. Ia
213. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1398 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1987),
aff'd, 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991). It is true, as Herbert
recognized, that the defamatory impact of some publications is different than that of the sepa-
rate statements. For an example of such a situation, see supra note 122. In such situations
analyzing each statement separately may lead to the conclusion that the plaintiff has not been
defamed, even though when taken together the statements create a defamatory inference. This
type of publication poses trickier issues of apportioning causation of harm to the plaintiff's
reputation between the different statements.
214. Masson, 686 F. Supp. at 1398 n.3. The district court found that the "defamatory
impact" of the article as a whole, and of the individual statements, was that "Masson is a vain,
arrogant egotist." Id.
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tal harm doctrine, or its subsidiary-statement variant, concluding instead
that there was no evidence of actual malice as to any of the statements.215
At the Ninth Circuit level, the incremental harm doctrine was ex-
plicitly invoked.2 16 Although it cited Herbert and its subsidiary-state-
ment rule,217 the court apparently applied the core218 version of the
incremental harm doctrine.2 19
It is also unclear why the Ninth Circuit majority invoked the incre-
mental harm doctrine only with regard to the "intellectual gigolo" com-
ment.22 It may indicate that the majority simply was unsure of whether
the passage actually was a "rational interpretation" of Masson's com-
ments, and thus did not involve actual malice. The dismissal of this pas-
sage under the incremental harm doctrine seems rather glib, since the
court had not yet even discussed nine of the challenged statements. Fur-
thermore, Masson calling himself an "intellectual gigolo" would have
gone beyond mere bombast and provocativeness; this statement sounds
like self-deprecation, whereas most of Masson's other "provocative"
comments involved self-promotion.221
The imprecise invocation and application of the incremental harm
215. Id at 1399-1406. If the court had really been convinced that the case was like Herbert
in that the defamatory implication of each statement was the same and that this defamatory
impact was in turn the same as the defamatory impact of the article as a whole, the court
might have taken a shortcut. Rather than analyze each statement separately, the court might
have instead first concluded that, as in Herbert and Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union
of United States, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), there was ample evidence on which
the author could have based her conclusion that Masson was a "vain, arrogant egotist." The
court could then have simply discussed whether each of the challenged statements "merely
imply the same view," Herbert, 781 F.2d at 312, as the defamatory implication of the article as
a whole.
216. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1541. The court invoked the incremental harm doctrine even
though neither party argued it on appeal. Id at 1565 (Kozinski, 3., dissenting).
217. I at 1541.
218. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text for a discussion of the core version of
the doctrine.
219. The court concluded: "Given the general tenor of the article and the many provoca-
tive, bombastic statements indisputably made by Masson and quoted by Malcolm, the addi-
tional harm caused by the 'intellectual gigolo' quote was nominal or nonexistent, rendering the
defamation claim as to this quote non-actionable." Mason, 895 F.2d at 154 (emphasis added).
The court "apparently" applied the core version of the doctrine because the court offered the
"core" definition of the incremental harm doctrine, then offered the Herbert subsidiary-state-
ment version, then came to the above conclusion. The dissent treated the majority decision as
an application of the core version of the doctrine. Id. at 1565 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("Tihe
majority fundamentally misreads Herbert. Herbert scrupulously avoids holding that if incre-
mental harm above nonactionable portions of a publication is only minimal, then the plaintiff
cannot recover as a matter of law.").
220. Id. at 1541.
221. As the dissent saw it, the difference between Masson's actual statements and the intel-
lectual gigolo statements as they appeared in the article was that "one suggests that Masson is
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doctrine concepts in this case is typical of previous courts' and commen-
tators' lack of rigor in defining the doctrine-particularly in failing to
perceive the fundamental difference between the core incremental harm
doctrine and the subsidiary-statement variation of it propounded by the
Second Circuit in Herbert.222
Since the Ninth Circuit failed to provide a rationale for the rule, or
to even explain whether it was rooted in common-law injury and causa-
tion requirements, the California Constitution or the United States Con-
stitution, Judge Kozinski's strong dissent offered the Supreme Court a
persuasive reason to reject the doctrine, at least as it was used in this
case.
The Supreme Court in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. 223 re-
jected "any suggestion that the incremental harm doctrine is compelled
as a matter of First Amendment protection for speech. 224 Indeed, given
the constitutional considerations that are intertwined with the incremen-
tal harm doctrine,225 the Court could not have ruled otherwise without at
the same time constitutionalizing principles relating to nominal damages
and punitive damages.226 This the Court has so far been unwilling to
do.
227
Given the Court's unwillingness to extend constitutional protection
to the incremental harm doctrine, and by extension to these other areas
on which there is disagreement, there are alternatives for courts con-
cerned about limiting the potentially damaging effects of frivolous defa-
mation actions. Notwithstanding federal disapproval, a better-defined
incremental harm doctrine may still have a function to play at the state
law level. The following sections address the scope of the doctrine, and
how it ought to be applied.
B. The Incremental Harm Doctrine and the Subsidiary-Statement
Variant: Two Different Rules
One of the impediments to a coherent development of the incremen-
a young man with potential, the other makes him out to be a clown." Id. at 1552 (Kozinski,
J., dissenting).
222. For a discussion of the difference between the core version of the incremental harm
doctrine and the subsidiary-statement variant, see infra notes 228-40 and accompanying text.
223. 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
224. Id. at 2438.
225. See supra notes 52-68 and accompanying text.
226. These were potential issues in the case, because had Masson been able to prove actual
malice with regard to the "intellectual gigolo" quote, under Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974), Masson could have received punitive damages, regardless of whether the
actual injury was nominal.
227. See supra notes 52-68 and accompanying text.
June 1992] 1515
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:1483
tal harm doctrine has been a confusion between the subsidiary-statement
variant of the rule enunciated by the Second Circuit in Herbert v.
Lando 22 and the core version of the doctrine. Although the Second Cir-
cuit in Herbert insisted it was not applying the incremental harm doc-
trine,229 courts and commentators have persisted in citing Herbert when
discussing the doctrine.230
Yet should the subsidiary-statement rule even be described as a vari-
ant of the incremental harm doctrine? The court in Herbert did not
think so. 231 And indeed the Herbert subsidiary-statement rule simply
recognizes that when a court is faced with a false and potentially defama-
tory statement, the court must analyze whether the implication of the
statement is the same as the implication of the statements the court has
already found nonactionable. 232 Then-Judge Scalia also accepted this
principle in a footnote to Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson.233 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has recognized the importance in certain situations of
analyzing the implication of a challenged statement.234
The subsidiary-statement rule is thus a relatively uncontroversial
rule. However, it is more closely related to the substantial truth doe-
228. 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986).
229. Id at 311 n.10.
230. See, eg., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1541 (9th Cir. 1989),
rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991); Dorsey v. National Enquirer, Inc., No. CV 89-0209, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6084, at *14-15 (C.D. Cal. 1990); Crane v. Arizona Republic, 729 F. Supp. 698,
707 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Marder, supra note 105, at 1004-05.
231. Herbert, 781 F.2d at 311 n.10.
232. Id at 312.
233. 746 F.2d 1563, 1568 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242
(1986). Judge Scalia wrote:
If, for example, an individual is said to have been convicted of 35 burglaries, when
the correct number is 34, it is not likely that the statement is actionable. That is so,
however, not because the object of the remarks is "libel proof," but because, since the
essentially derogatory implication of the statement ("he is an habitual burglar") is
correct, he has not been libeled.
Id The result would thus presumably be the same if the article contained true statements
describing 34 convictions of the plaintiff for burglary, and a separate statement describing a
35th burglary that is, in fact, false.
Judge Scalia failed, however, to articulate how exactly his burglar hypothetical differs
from Benedict Arnold being called a shoplifter. Theoretically, in the Arnold hypothetical, the
shoplifting statement is on a different "subject" than the subject on which Arnold is libel-
proof. But at another level of abstraction, it could be said that both statements impugn Ar-
nold's honesty, or his reputation for not being a criminal. Conversely, perhaps the 35th bur-
glary is on a different "subject" than the first 34-that is, each separate allegation of burglary
is potentially libelous. After all, if "[t]he law proceeds on the optimistic premise that there is a
little bit of good in all of us--or perhaps upon the pessimistic assumption that no matter how
bad someone is, he can always be worse," Liberty Lobby, 746 F.2d at 1568, then a person who
commits 35 burglaries is surely worse than a person who commits 34.
234. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2707 (1990).
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trine23s than to the incremental harm doctrine. For when false state-
ments merely imply the same view as unchallenged statements, the
publication might also be said to be substantially true.236
More controversial is the version of the rule applying to situations
when the challenged and nonactionable portions of the publication are on
"entirely different subjects. '237 When the incremental harm doctrine is
invoked, it is sometimes not clear which version of the rule is being ap-
plied.2 31 Courts should first analyze whether the incremental harm doc-
trine or the subsidiary-statement rule2 39 is applicable. If the core version
of the incremental harm doctrine could apply to the situation at bar, the
question of whether the doctrine should be recognized under state tort
principles or state constitutional protections for free speech depends on
how the jurisdiction holds the balance between First Amendment inter-
ests on the one hand and, within constitutional parameters, the interests
of defamation plaintiffs on the other.'z 4
C. Sources of Law
The First Amendment is not the only possible source of tort-limiting
doctrine. As the Supreme Court noted in Masson v. New Yorker Maga-
zine, Inc. ,241 "state tort law doctrines of injury, causation, and damages
calculation" might permit a plaintiff to prevail on an incremental harm
theory.242 If in fact state tort law doctrines of causation and injury are
stringently applied in defamation actions, constitutionalizing the incre-
mental harm doctrine may be unnecessary.
State statutes and constitutions offer a second source of protection
for libel defendants from actions based on incrementally damaging state-
ments. In some instances, state free-speech and free-press laws are as or
more protective of freedom of speech than the First Amendment.243
235. See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
237. See, eg., Liberty Lobby, 746 F.2d at 1568. Again, it may be difficult for a court to tell
when a statement is subsidiary to other statements and when it is on a different subject. Which
analysis a court applies might depend on how the court defines the "subjects" of these state-
ments. It is theoretically possible for a court to avoid applying the incremental harm analysis
by defining both the nonactionable and the challenged statements at a high level of abstraction,
in order to hold that one is merely "subsidiary" to the other.
238. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
239. The substantial truth doctrine is a third possibility.
240. For a discussion of the types of interests protected by defamation laws, and what types
of injuries are compensable, see infra notes 256-73 and accompanying text.
241. 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
242. Id. at 2436.
243. The Supreme Court has held that where state law provides an adequate and independ-
ent basis for deciding an issue, "there is no need for decision of the federal issue." City of
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The Court has been reluctant to trample on the states' rights to fol-
low their own tort laws so long as they do not interfere with constitu-
tional rights. 2" Because the Court has left the door open for states to
institute their own rules relating to presumed, nominal and punitive
damages (at least in some cases),245 and declined to require proof of harm
to reputation as a constitutional prerequisite to defamation recovery,246 it
was unlikely that the Court in Masson would confer First Amendment
status on the incremental harm doctrine.
D. The Problem of Causation
Incremental harm situations require a court to analyze two basic
causation issues. First, how much injury must a statement cause in order
Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 294-95 (1982); see also Siler v. Louisville &
Nash. R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909) (holding that federal courts should avoid adjudication of
issues when alternative state-law grounds are available).
California's Liberty of Speech Clause has been interpreted by California courts to provide
more protection for expressive activity than does the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution California's Liberty of Speech Clause provides: "Every person may freely speak,
write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this
right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." CAL. CONsT. art. I,
§ 2(a). The California Supreme Court has stated that the protection afforded in the Liberty of
Speech Clause is "more definitive and inclusive than the First Amendment." Wilson v. Supe-
rior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652, 658, 532 P.2d 116, 120, 119 Cal. Rptr. 468, 472 (1975); see also
Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899, 908, 592 P.2d 341, 346, 153 Cal. Rptr.
854, 859 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (noting past decisions testify to greater protections
afforded liberty of speech under California Constitution than Federal Constitution).
All 50 states have free-speech and free-press guarantees in their constitutions. But as the
California experience demonstrates, how much protection is afforded by a state's constitutional
provision often is a matter of court interpretation. See Michael G. Allport & Steven C. Bald-
win, Defamation and State Constitutions: The Search for a State Law Based Standard After
Gertz, 19 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 665, 680-82 (1983) (discussing evolution of case law under
Oregon constitutional free-speech guarantee); Peter P. Miller, Freedom of Expression Under
State Constitutions, 20 STAN. L. REv. 318, 329-30 (1968) (citing state court decisions affording
higher protection for speech than federal law as evidence of importance of maintaining state
courts' independence in this area). But see Todd F. Simon, Independent but Inadequate: State
Constitutions and Protection of Freedom of Expression, 33 KAN. L. REv. 305, 337-39 (1985)
(arguing that increase in state courts deciding free-speech cases on state-law grounds has led to
lack of uniformity in development of state law in this area with resulting chilling effect on
national press).
244. See, eg., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) ("The legitimate state
interest in the underlying law of libel is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted
on them by defamatory falsehood. We would not lightly require the State to abandon this
purpose."); id. at 347 ("We hold that so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the
States may decide for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broad-
caster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.").
245. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 52-59.
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to be actionable?2 47 And second, how may a court determine how much
of the overall injury from a large publication is attributable to a particu-
lar challenged statement?
Given a publication containing a number of damaging statements
about a plaintiff, one group of which is challenged in a defamation action
and one group of which is either unchallenged or nonactionable, there
are, theoretically, three ways that the statements could interact to cause
harm. The simplest scenario is one in which each statement adds a dis-
crete amount of harm.248
In other scenarios, the harm caused by the two groups of statements
might be identical; each would have caused by itself the same harm that
was caused by the two statements together. This effect, known as "over-
determination, ' 249 is relevant mainly in relation to the subsidiary-state-
ment rule, and seems to be what courts are implying when they state that
the challenged statements "merely imply the same view"2 50 as the un-
challenged statements. Thus, to take an easy example, a publication con-
tains two different accounts of the same type of criminal activity by the
247. To a certain degree, the resolution of this issue by a particular court will depend on
whether defamation suits in which the plaintiff is likely to recover only nominal damages are
sustainable in the jurisdiction. But to a certain extent resolving the issue will also depend on
how the court answers the question, what type of injury is compensable? The answer may
determine whether a minimal "amount" of injury is enough. See infra notes 256-73 and ac-
companying text.
248. For example, if the statement is "Jack is a thief, and he cheats on his wife," the total
reputational damage consists of Jack's being labeled a thief and an adulterer; if the marriage
dissolves, his social damages might consist of the loss of his marital relationship; his actual
(pecuniary) damage might encompass whatever pecuniary assistance his wife had provided, as
well as lost employment or other business opportunities. For a discussion of the types of
injuries that are compensable in defamation actions, see infra notes 256-65 and accompanying
text.
249. Overdetermination is a problem that has been discussed in connection to the "but for"
model of causation. See H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 125-29,
243-45 (1985), for a discussion of the common law's treatment of the causal overdetermination
problem. As a result of this problem, the Restatement (Second) of Torts replaced the "but for"
test with the "substantial factor" test. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1977). One
variation of what Hart and Honore call the "anomaly" of overdetermination occurs when
"two causes, each of them sufficient to bring about the same harm, are present on the same
occasion." HART & HONOR, supra, at 123. The Restatement offers the following illustration:
Two fires are negligently set by separate acts of the A and B Companies in forest
country during a dry season. The two fires coalesce before setting fire to C's timber
land and house. The normal spread of either fire would have been sufficient to bum
the house and timber. C barely escapes from his house, suffering bums while so
doing. It may be found that the negligence of either the A or the B Company or of
both is a substantial factor in bringing about C's harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra, § 432 cmt. d, illus. 3.
250. Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298, 312 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986).
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plaintiff-for example, involving petty theft25 -and only the first ac-
count is true or otherwise privileged.252 The aggregate effect of the two
statements is to give the reader the impression that the plaintiff is a petty
thief, yet each of the statements alone would have sufficed to cause the
same harm to the plaintiff's reputation.
In a third scenario, the first two effects are combined. Here, the
amount of damage caused by the two statements is different when made
separately and when made in the same publication. For example, two
separate articles-perhaps in different newspapers-contain false state-
ments about a prominent person. One states that he had once taken a
bribe; the second states that he had once bounced a check. Or, one states
that the plaintiff has a drug problem; the second states that he had once
attended a party at which it is widely known that illegal drugs were cir-
culated freely. It is possible that, stated in separate publications, each
statement could be equally damaging to the person's reputation and
standing in the community. Yet if the two statements were published in
the same article, the damage caused by the first statement might substan-
tially overshadow the second statement.253 The plaintiff's reputation
might suffer the same amount of damage, but the amount of injury done
by each separate statement is different. Alternatively, the second state-
ment might have an insignificant effect on the plaintiff's reputation when
made in a separate publication,25 4 but by combining the statement in the
same article as the first statement, its effect might be greatly magnified.255
251. Accounts of two separate types of criminal activity-for instance, loan sharking and
petty theft, where only one is potentially actionable-present a different problem. If the over-
all implication of the nonactionable statement is that the plaintiff is a petty criminal, then the
second statement "merely implies the same view" and should also be nonactionable. But if the
implication of the nonactionable statement is more narrowly construed, for example simply
that the plaintiff is a loan shark, then the plaintiff's reputation may still have been damaged by
the second statement. See infra notes 261-73 for a discussion of the problem of analyzing
injury to a person's dignity.
252. A statement is constitutionally privileged, for example, if the plaintiff is a public figure
and cannot show with convincing clarity that the statement was published with actual malice.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). At common law, privileges include
reports on judicial proceedings and fair comment on matters of public concern. See KEETON
et al., supra note 27, § 114, at 816, § 115, at 831. For a full discussion of privileges, see KEE-
TON et al., supra note 27, §§ 114-115.
253. The attention aroused by the bribe or drug allegation could result in a less significant
statement in the same article being virtually ignored by the public.
254. The check-bouncing statement could be made, for example, in a profile of the plaintiff
that contained mostly positive information offset by some information critical of the plaintiff.
Its effect might then be relatively mild.
255. For example, the check-bouncing allegation might take an added significance if com-
bined with other statements about the plaintiff's alleged malfeasance. Another example of two
statements' combined effect being different from their separate singular effects is the situation
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E. Dignitary Interests Versus Social and Economic Harms
The future of the incremental harm doctrine is tied to how courts
determine another central issue: what interests are protected by the tort
of defamation and by free-speech doctrines? How these interests are de-
fined is crucial in deciding whether any of the three doctrines discussed-
the incremental harm doctrine, the subsidiary statement rule or the sub-
stantial truth defense-makes sense.
The interest protected by the tort of defamation is the individual's
interest in his or her reputation and good name.25 6 According to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, a communication is defamatory if it
"tends to so harm the reputation of a person as to lower him in the esti-
mation of the community or to deter other people from associating or
dealing with him."257
Defining the interests protected by defamation law, however, is eas-
ier than defining what harms should be compensable. Injury to reputa-
tion is a difficult thing to measure, particularly in monetary terms.258
But traditionally, the types of damages that may be compensable by defa-
mation law can be divided into three broad categories: economic, social
and dignitary.
Economic damages include lost business opportunities, contracts or
employment.2 59 Social damages include the lost society of friends and
associates.2" Dignitary damages may include wounded feelings, humili-
ation and embarrassment.
261
Traditionally, at common law, social damages were not enough in
themselves to sustain a cause of action, but were compensable as "para-
previously discussed, in which a publication states that a robbery occurred at noon at Main
and Elm, and that the plaintiff was at that intersection at noon on that day. See supra note
122. However, in this situation, the plaintiff is suing over the inference that arises from the
two statements, and the publication must be evaluated as a whole in order to discern the
defamatory inference. In the incremental harm situation, the alleged defamatory inference of
each separate statement is at issue.
256. KEETON et al., supra note 27, § 111, at 771.
257. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 249, § 559.
258. See KEETON et al., supra note 27, § 11 6A, at 843 ("Since some of the interests served
by way of protecting a good reputation are of a peace-of-mind and dignitary nature rather than
economic in character, such losses are not readily measurable in monetary terms.").
259. Id. § 112, at 794.
260. Id. at 796.
261. Id. at 794. In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), the Supreme
Court held that for public figures and public officials to recover for the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, they must show that the publication contains a false statement
of fact that was made with "actual malice"-with knowledge that the statement was false or
with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true. Id. at 56.
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sitic" damages once a loss of reputation was established.262 If we mea-
sure the impact of a defamatory communication in terms of economic or
even social damages, then in situations where specific statements, and not
the overall import of a publication, are at issue, it is possible that some
defamatory statements in a communication may have caused more dam-
age than others. If some of those statements are not actionable as a mat-
ter of law, then a court should assess how much of the overall damage
was done to the plaintiff's reputation by each statement, and subtract the
damage deemed caused by the nonactionable statements. 263 This is im-
portant in order to protect the countervailing interests protected by the
First Amendment and other free-speech laws.261 These free-speech con-
cerns are the basis for providing protection for true or privileged
statements.265
If a court is lax in apportioning the ratio of harm caused by the
challenged and the nonactionable statements in a publication, a jury
might feel free to award damages engendered by its opinion of the nonac-
tionable material. To the extent this happens, the protections afforded to
the nonactionable remainder of the publication are essentially nullified.
On the other hand, if the interest protected by defamation law is
defined as essentially the protection of one's dignity (a "dignitary" inter-
est),2 66 it is possible to reach a very different result. If this is the type of
interest that is permissibly protected by defamation law, then arguably
there can never be an overdetermination 267 effect in libel cases. This idea
underlies Judge Scalia's statement in Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson 
26
that "[iut is shameful that Benedict Arnold was a traitor; but he was not a
shoplifter to boot, and one should not have been able to make that charge
while knowing its falsity with impunity. ' 269 This view implies that each
violation of the tort harms one's dignity and is therefore compensable
262. KEETON et al., supra note 27, § 112, at 794-95.
263. See supra notes 248-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of different ways indi-
vidual statements can combine within a publication to cause injury.
264. For a discussion of the interests underlying the First Amendment and other free-
speech laws, see supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
265. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) (recognizing that
"erroneous statement" must be protected in some cases to protect freedom of expression).
266. Dignitary torts include assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, in-
tentional infliction of mental anguish, libel and slander, invasion of privacy and alienation of
affections. DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 7.1, at 509 (1973).
These torts "involve some confrontation with the plaintiff in person or some indirect affront to
his personality." Iad
267. For a discussion of the overdetermination problem, see supra note 249.
268. 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
269. Aia at 1568.
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regardless of whether it causes separate measurable pecuniary harm. In
effect, damages may be assessed for adding insult to injury.
Again, the problem with this approach is that a jury could assign all
of the harm from a defamatory publication to the challenged statements,
even when they seem relatively minor in comparison with the overall
publication, which is constitutionally protected. For if a plaintiff is per-
mitted to recover for each separate affront to his or her dignity, it may be
possible for a plaintiff to convince a jury that even a very minor state-
ment caused a large amount of psychic pain. Besides the incentive to
exaggerate for a plaintiff trying to recover damages for such an immea-
surable injury, there is a danger that juries will be influenced by the con-
stitutionally protected material and will grant large awards for seemingly
minor slights to a plaintiff's dignity. The constitutional protections
would then be nullified.
The problem of how to treat dignitary injuries affects not only the
incremental harm doctrine, but also the substantial truth doctrine270 and
the subsidiary-statement rule.27 1 If each defamatory statement by defini-
tion adds a discrete and compensable amount of injury to a plaintiff's
dignity, it makes no difference if the publication is "substantially true" or
even if the statement merely "implies the same view" as the remainder of
the publication. Each statement will necessarily be actionable in itself
regardless of how it affects or is affected by the nonactionable remainder
of the publication.272
An alternative to this approach to dignitary injuries is for a jury to
first determine the overall harm caused to the plaintiff by the publication
as a whole. The jury should next determine what proportion of that
damage was reasonably caused by the statements at issue. There might
still be some danger that the jury could award damages out of proportion
to the causal effects of the statements at issue, thus potentially eroding
the protection afforded to the nonactionable portions of the publication.
But the danger would be greatly reduced if the jury were specifically in-
structed to apportion the damage done by the actionable and nonaction-
able statements.
273
270. See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 101.
272. See supra text accompanying note 115 for Judge Scalia's view of injury to reputation.
273. The alternative to allowing the jury to consider the publication as a whole would be to
allow the jury to consider the effect of each statement by itself. This approach increases the
chances of distorting the effects of the statements. When the jury is instructed as to apportion-
ment of damage, however, it is provided with some guidelines to follow in ensuring that the
damage award is proportionate to the damage caused. The analysis may also be helpful to a
reviewing court attempting to assess whether a damage award is excessive.
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F. A Restatement of the Incremental Harm Doctrine
The incremental harm doctrine flows from a concern for keeping
libel law, which protects individual interests, strictly bounded by princi-
ples of tort causation in order to further free-speech principles. 4 Appli-
cation of the rule will depend on how a jurisdiction treats the issues of
nominal damages, punitive damages and the actual-injury require-
ment.275 The rule should simply be that where a plaintiff challenges as
defamatory only a minor statement in an otherwise extremely damaging
publication, a court should either (1) dismiss the case (if the jurisdiction
is one where suits in which a plaintiff can hope to win nominal damages
at best must be dismissed),27 6 or (2) instruct the jury as to the law of
causation and damages to ensure that the jury awards damages only in
proportion to the harm actually caused by the challenged statements in
relation to the rest of the publication.277
As an illustration of how this rule should be applied, consider the
facts of Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. 278 Suppose the Ninth Cir-
cuit had established that.all of the fabricated quotes in Janet Malcolm's
article were nonactionable because there was insufficient evidence from
which a reasonable jury might infer actual malice, except for the "intel-
lectual gigolo" quote.27 9 The thrust of this statement is that Masson be-
lieves his peers see him as some kind of intellectual prostitute. The
nonactionable remainder of the article,280 by contrast, portrays Masson
as a vain egotist.
To overcome summary judgment, Masson would be required to pro-
vide some detail as to what damage the statements at issue caused-for
example, the loss of society, lost business opportunities, embarrassment
274. See, eg., Simmons Ford, Inc., v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 516 F. Supp.
742, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("[P]laintiffs' reputational interest... is minimal when compared
with the First Amendment interests at stake.").
275. See supra notes 52-68 and accompanying text.
276. See, eg., Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 1511, 1518-19 (D.NJ.
1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 847 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1988); Jackson v. Longeope, 476
N.E.2d 617, 619 (Mass. 1985).
277. Under Texas law, for example, "evidence of a previously tarnished reputation may be
proved in mitigation of actual or exemplary damages." Langston v. Eagle Publishing Co., 719
S.W.2d 612, 622-23 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (citing TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 73.003 (West 1986)).
278. 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
279. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. For the purposes of this discussion, the
difference between the Ninth Circuit's "rational interpretation" test and the Supreme Court's
"material alteration" test will be ignored.
280. For purposes of this hypothetical, the "nonactionable remainder" includes the other
statements actually at issue in Masson. For a summary of these statements, see supra notes
159-80 and accompanying text.
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and humiliation.28 Once the court has narrowed the cause of action
down to the one "intellectual gigolo" statement, it will then have to eval-
uate the evidence and determine whether the challenged statement has
contributed more than a nominal amount of the overall damage that the
plaintiff has allegedly suffered. The court thus must first weigh the over-
all damage done by the publication as a whole, and determine what pro-
portion of that damage could reasonably be said to have been caused by
the "intellectual gigolo" quote. If the court were to determine that no
reasonable jury could find that the challenged statement caused more
than a nominal amount of the overall damage done by the overall publi-
cation, then the court would either (1) grant a directed verdict for the
defendant if nominal damages are not recoverable in a defamation action
in that jurisdiction, or (2) allow the case to go to the jury with strict
instructions that it must first determine how much damage was caused
by the overall article, and then award damages for the "intellectual gig-
olo" quote only in proportion to the damage that statement actually
caused.282
This analysis would also apply in the classic "core" incremental
harm situation-for example, where a publication labels a plaintiff a
murderer, a rapist and a reckless driver,283 and the plaintiff challenges
only the latter statement. Where, however, the publication includes
statements asserting that the plaintiff had committed a burglary and had
bought burglary tools, 284 and the first statement is true, the court may
dismiss the action on the basis either that the second statement is subsidi-
ary to the first and merely implies the same view (that the plaintiff com-
mitted the burglary), or that the publication was substantially true.
281. See supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text. All of these types of damage are re-
coverable under California Civil Code section 48a. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a (West 1982).
282. This analysis has obvious ramifications for the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine as well.
For if Benedict Arnold were to challenge a defamatory publication that stated he was a shop-
lifter, a jury would have to weigh how much damage to a traitor's reputation is caused by a
false allegation of shoplifting. This is true not because a person's reputation is a "monolith,"
Liberty Lobby v. Anderson, Inc., 746 F.2d 1563, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other
grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986), but simply because of tort principles of causation. Arnold's
strongest claim, that each defamatory statement is a discrete insult to one's dignity, can be
dispensed with by the observation that if one's standing in the community already is low be-
cause of a severely damaged reputation in one area, the amount of humiliation or righteous
indignation that is likely to be caused by any further verbal assaults on one's dignity is slight.
Society's interest in a free and robust press is stronger than such an individual's interest in
redressing an injury to his or her dignity that any reasonable jury would be likely to see as
trivial.
283. See Comment, supra note 49, at 1025.
284. See supra note 101.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine,
Inc. concluded that the incremental harm doctrine is not mandated by
the First Amendment, it considered the doctrine in the context of an
inappropriate application by the Ninth Circuit. Given the uncertainty of
the meaning of the Court's requirement of "actual injury" in libel con-
texts, the varying interpretations of whether libel actions for nominal
damages are sustainable, and the varying manners in which state libel
laws protect libel defendants, it is still possible for courts concerned with
the chilling effects of libel litigation to apply a more rigorously defined
incremental harm doctrine. Until a more fundamental reform of libel
law is accomplished, this possibility offers one of the few tools available
for dismissing lawsuits whose only purpose is to harass the defendant,
rather than to redress a cognizable injury.
However, the incremental harm doctrine is useful not only as a pos-
sible bar to litigation, but as a means of identifying and carefully restrict-
ing a plaintiff's recovery. This Note has discussed how statements
within a publication can interact to damage a plaintiff's reputation. If
courts develop a more rigorous approach to analyzing causation issues in
such cases, they will go a long way toward preventing nuisance libel suits
even in the absence of a constitutional mandate.
Jay Framson *
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